United States: Europe with Eyes Wide Shut
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses the United States.
Transformative securitization: Rethinking the Copenhagen School in light of COVID-19, climate change, and the war in Ukraine
This article advances securitization theory by introducing the concept of transformative securitization, in which crises are not only framed as existential threats but also as catalysts for reconstituting political orders. Drawing on the Copenhagen School and Hannah Arendt’s notion of natality, the article distinguishes transformative securitization from conservative forms that aim to preserve the status quo. It conceptualizes transformative securitization through three dimensions: agency (bottom-up and participatory), procedure (disruptive yet potentially democratizing), and outcome (yielding durable institutional or normative change). Through empirical illustrations from Denmark and Norway’s responses to COVID-19, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and climate change, the article shows how securitization can both constrain and enable democratic transformation. It finds that while some responses reinforce executive power and narrow deliberative space, others—especially in climate politics—reflect participatory and future-oriented securitizing moves that can reconfigure societal sectors or entire polities. Climate change emerges as a paradigmatic case of transformative securitization, where intergenerational justice and systemic change are driven by civic agency. By bridging crisis and political founding, the concept refines securitization theory’s understanding of extraordinary politics and offers new tools to analyze the democratic potential and pitfalls of security responses in an era of overlapping, urgent predicaments.
Not What to Have, but How to Have It: Japan’s Debate on Acquiring Counterstrike Capabilities 2016–2023
As part of its historic defense buildup, Japan is incorporating counterstrike capabilities in its defense posture. While previous administrations were reluctant to pursue such capabilities, during the second Abe administration (2012–2020) the Liberal Democratic Party-Kōmeitō coalition eventually deemed them necessary for Japan’s self-defense. However, the belief that conducting counterstrikes is within the boundaries of Japan’s constitution and exclusively defense-oriented policy is contested. In this article, we study the parliamentary debate on acquiring counterstrike capabilities and examine how Japanese politicians discuss the parameters of the use of this controversial military instrument. Based on a content analysis of parliamentary transcripts, we find that three topics in particular are central to the debate on counterstrike capabilities: (1) the defense of Taiwan, (2) the role of the US in Japan’s defense and interoperability, and (3) the impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Although the opposition and ruling parties differ in their positions on the parameters for conducting counterstrikes, such an acquisition is no longer politically unsustainable. As such, the parliamentary debate is increasingly about the use and implementation of counterstrikes rather than their existence at all.
Lithuania: Balancing Ambition with Capacity
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Lithuania.
Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine: A Multinational Force in the Making
In March 2025, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron launched a Coalition of the Willing to support Ukraine. Militarily, 26 countries have reportedly committed to securing Ukraine with troops on land, at sea, and in the air “the day after a ceasefire or peace,” under a planned Multinational Force Ukraine. This briefing highlights the main findings from a collection of country profiles. It concludes that a Multinational Force Ukraine is still hypothetical, but if it materializes, coalition members will be in for the long run. European leaders should act, plan, and prepare based on that assumption.
Germany: heavy on funding, light on force
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Germany.
Sweden: Politically Willing, but Militarily Constrained
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Sweden.
Webinar: Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine: A Multinational Force in the Making
How can a Coalition of the Willing support Ukraine, and what might a Multinational Force Ukraine look like? This online launch event presents a new collection of policy briefs that explores these questions.
Poland as the Coalition’s logistical backbone: Powering the front
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Poland.