China’s EU policy in the pandemic era: A new normal?
During the pandemic era, media reports and leaks indicate a growing assertiveness from China towards the EU. Is this a sign of a new normal in China's EU policy of something else entirely? To devise an appropriate response, the EU should contrast this perceived assertiveness with China's long-term interests. In all, assertive behavior undermines Chinese policy goals, which hints that there may be other considerations guiding these Chinese representatives.
The “Faceless Evildoers” of Cabo Delgado: an Islamist Insurgency in Mozambique?
A brief assessment about the emergence of a jihadi group in Mozambique
Jihad globale o insurgency locale? L'ISIS in Africa, da Boko Haram allo Stato Islamico nel Grande Sahara
This chapter sums up the evolution of jihadi activity in Mali and around Lake Chad, connecing local events to the concurrent emergence and evolution of the Islamic State.
The Origins of Boko Haram, and Why the War on Terror Matters
This article, prompted as a response to a recent contribution penned by Audu Bulama Bukarti,returns to the history of an incident occurred in 2003 between the Nigerian security and a group of militants popularly known as the “Nigerian Taliban” and considered as a precursor to Boko Haram. While the historiography around this incident has been almost saturated by debates around the size of the links between the “Nigerian Taliban” and al-Qaeda, that period of Nigerian history continues to be read in isolation from the broader counter-terrorism strategies conceived at the time by the Nigerian State in the context of what, for us, is a fundamental structural factor, i.e. the then mounting Global War on Terror. Drawing on a different set of data than Bukarti, our contribution will argue that, far from having been a “local” incident, the “Nigerian Taliban crisis” shows clear signs of how, at the time, the Nigerian space was being penetrated by the War on Terror’s strategic logic, discursive structures and political imperatives. The successive explosion, over the following years, of the “Boko Haram phenomenon”, is in our opinion the result of the latter as much as of the former.
When every act is war: Post-Crimea conflict dynamics and Russian foreign policy (WARU)
Tension between great powers in world politics is escalating rapidly. What are the driving forces behind deteriorating relations? Can we explain them solely by the ‘aggressiveness’ of ...
The new oil? The geopolitics and international governance of hydrogen
While most hydrogen research focuses on the technical and cost hurdles to a full-scale hydrogen economy, little consideration has been given to the geopolitical drivers and consequences of hydrogen developments. The technologies and infrastructures underpinning a hydrogen economy can take markedly different forms, and the choice over which pathway to take is the object of competition between different stakeholders and countries. Over time, cross-border maritime trade in hydrogen has the potential to fundamentally redraw the geography of global energy trade, create a new class of energy exporters, and reshape geopolitical relations and alliances between countries. International governance and investments to scale up hydrogen value chains could reduce the risk of market fragmentation, carbon lock-in, and intensified geo-economic rivalry.
China and South Asia Crisis Management in the Era of Great Power Competition
Until very recently, China had been seen as an important and constructive force in the crisis management in South Asia in the event of an India-Pakistan military crisis. Part of the perception originated from historical evidence, such as China’s shuttle diplomacy between India and Pakistan after 1998, and such as after the 2008 Mumbai attack. But more importantly, the perception is based on the belief that China, with its vast stake in the region’s peace and stability, will be objective in its assessment and management of the crisis, even if it may not be completely neutral between India and Pakistan. Following that logic, the increasing risk to which China is exposed due to its Belt and Road investments and infrastructure development in the region will draw China even more into third-party crisis management in South Asia. This belief has become increasingly challenged due to the shifting power balance in the region and, more broadly, among China, the United States (U.S.), and India in their trilateral interactions. Although China is interested in preventing a nuclear war, under that threshold, its interest in crisis management is constantly subject to its definition of its national interest in the changing regional power balance and great power dynamics. With the deepening U.S.-China great power rivalry, the growing signs of alignment between the U.S. and India, as well as a weakening Pakistan, the foundation of China’s policy towards South Asia—a perceived balance of power between India and Pakistan and China’s advantage as a superior third party—is disappearing rapidly. With the deteriorating U.S.-China relations and great power competition, China’s instinct is to preserve its strategic leverage. In addition, with the border skirmishes between China and India continuing to flare up, China itself might become a party to the regional conflict.
Mitigating Perceived Threats in Russian and Norwegian Public Discourse (THREAT-DEFUSER)
THREAT-DEFUSER integrates state-of-the-art political science, linguistics, and media studies methods to forge a new multidisciplinary approach to hybrid warfare. The primary objective ...
Responsible Innovation and Happiness: A New Approach to the Effects of ICTs (HAPPY)
The project intends to contribute to the responsible innovation literature by carrying out a set of conceptual and empirical studies on the socio-economic effects of ICTs, considering ...