Critical communication infrastructures and Huawei
Recently, there have been growing cyber-safety concerns over telecom equipment made by the Chinese vendor Huawei. This has led many countries to ban Huawei from supplying equipment for building the next generation of mobile networks, 5G. Responses from mobile operators and the telecom community in general have been mixed. For instance, many European mobile operators have stated that these concerns are overblown and that such a ban would delay 5G rollout by two to three years in the best case. Moreover, some operators have directly questioned the ability of the other vendors to timely deliver a complete 5G network. However, these claims have mostly not been grounded in empirical data. This paper takes a multi-perspective approach to investigating this problem empirically. We start by categorizing responses from different countries to using Huawei equipment in 5G. We then analyze the importance and readiness of Huawei for supplying 5G equipment. This analysis is based on contributions to standards and patents. We also present a conceptual risk analysis framework to qualitatively evaluate the ability of a single vendor to cause considerable damage to critical communication infrastructures. This model aims at exploring a set of relevant axis. More specifically, we look at potential for harm in different political climates that is peace, crisis and war. Another axis is whether banning a particular vendor from supplying equipment for the upcoming mobile networks generation is useful without having a backward compatible ban. A third axis is the ability of a vendor to cause harm as a function of the type of supplied equipment, for example radio towers vs network management systems. Combining the analysis of readiness for supplying 5G and potential for causing harm allows us to roughly estimate the likely impact that a complete ban would have on 5G rollout in different parts of the world. We find that such a ban can possibly delay 5G by two years or more for operators with high dependence on Huawei. Consequently, we explore potential approaches that would both reduce vendor-related risk and do not significantly delay the rollout of 5G. These include heterogeneous multi-vendor deployments, equipment verification and testing, international collaboration as well as signing non-aggression treaties. Unfortunately, there is no technological solution that fully remedy this problem. Combining technical solutions with efforts to build trust between countries, enforce existing alignments or create new ones seems a promising way forward.
What global role for the EU after Brexit?
When the UK eventually leaves the EU, the EU's role as an actor in the world will change. In this seminar, Professor Mike Smith from the University of Warwick will present his work on the the interplay between Brexit and the EU’s international roles.
Theory seminar: States and Nature – The Effects of Climate Change on Security
Joshua Busby, University of Texas-Austin, will present the main argument and empirical work from his draft book manuscript.
Norge må tenke nytt i Persiabukta
(In norwegian only) I stedet for å si ja til å bidra militært i Persiabukta, er det mulig å tenke seg en mye mer proaktiv og klok norsk linje. Sommertid er glemselstid. Verden går tilsynelatende i sine vante spor. Og når vi endelig vender tilbake til kontorpulten, synes beste måte å takle jobbens utfordringer på å gjøre som vi pleier. Det bør ikke gjelde for norsk utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk. For der står vi ved et veiskille, og i løpet av sommeren har det dukket opp en ny prøvestein for Norge.
Konflikt, ustabilitet og migranter: "post-Gaddafi blues" i Sahel
(In norwegian only) Hvilke lærdommer kan vi trekke av bombingen av Libya i 2011? Var krigføringen i tråd med krigens folkerett? Brøt norske myndigheter grunnloven i forbindelse med krigsdeltagelsen? Levde media opp til sitt samfunnsoppdrag så lenge krigføringen i Libya pågikk? Ble det norske folk holdt for narr om de egentlige årsakene til krigen? Og hva ble konsekvensene av Libya-krigen for nasjonen Libya, regionen og verdenssamfunnet? Libya: Krigens uutholdelige letthet setter et kritisk søkelys på Norges deltagelse i den Nato-ledete operasjonen i Libya. Blant forfatterne finner vi folkerettsjurister, historikere, militære, statsvitere og professorer i journalistikk og fredsforskning. Et felles utgangspunkt for alle bidragsyterne er spørsmålet om hva norske politikere, militære og det norske folk kan og bør lære av Norges første krig i Afrika.
Liberale verdifellesskap og selvbilder i praksis: Hvordan Norge gikk til krig og hva vi kan lære
(In norwegian only) Hvilke lærdommer kan vi trekke av bombingen av Libya i 2011? Var krigføringen i tråd med krigens folkerett? Brøt norske myndigheter grunnloven i forbindelse med krigsdeltagelsen? Levde media opp til sitt samfunnsoppdrag så lenge krigføringen i Libya pågikk? Ble det norske folk holdt for narr om de egentlige årsakene til krigen? Og hva ble konsekvensene av Libya-krigen for nasjonen Libya, regionen og verdenssamfunnet? Libya: Krigens uutholdelige letthet setter et kritisk søkelys på Norges deltagelse i den Nato-ledete operasjonen i Libya. Blant forfatterne finner vi folkerettsjurister, historikere, militære, statsvitere og professorer i journalistikk og fredsforskning. Et felles utgangspunkt for alle bidragsyterne er spørsmålet om hva norske politikere, militære og det norske folk kan og bør lære av Norges første krig i Afrika.
The Politics of Diasporas and the Duty of Care: Legitimizing interventions through the protection of kin
The duty of care (DoC) is largely portrayed as being of a benevolent and liberal character, with welfare states aiding its citizens abroad. In this chapter Holm examines a more complex phenomenon involving the DoC: that of a state and its diaspora. Seeing Duty of Care in relation to diasporas poses a conceptual shift: often multinational in identification, with a perceived or real ‘homeland’, and at times with dual (legal) citizenship, diasporas may be sought protected under an extended, non-territorialized notion of belonging to a state’s citizenry. Looking at Russian rhetoric in the Georgia war in 2008 and the Crimean annexation and Ukraine crisis in 2014, Holm explores how the Duty of Care can be evoked rhetorically to defend diaspora groups by kin-states. In relation to a domestic audience, this prism proves highly effective, as the state portrays its actions as defending ‘their’ people abroad out of a moral necessity and responsibility for their kin. It also functions to dismiss international stigma and critique at home based on a perceived higher moral purpose. As in the case of diasporas in inter-state conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine, this turns the Duty of Care into a complicated, and potentially highly politicized, international matter. It also provides a communitarian alternative to the cosmopolitan R2P: in theory, any group can be defined as worth defending as one’s own, across and despite opposing claims to sovereignty. The chapter concludes with discussing the wider ramifications of diaspora group protection by kin-states for challenges to the liberal international order.