Gine Lund Bolling
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Gine Lund Bolling was a research fellow in the Research group on security and defence until July 2026.
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European nuclear deterrence: The french initiative
Join us for a conversation on European security in a time marked by war, nuclear threats, and growing strategic uncertainty. Against the backdrop...
When space policy becomes security policy: Norway’s participation in the EU’s space activities (EU Rom)
This report was commissioned by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries to inform decisions about Norway’s continued participation in EU space activities for 2028–2034. ...
Når rompolitikk blir sikkerhetspolitikk: Norsk deltakelse i EUs romaktiviteter
The report is in Norwegian but it has an English summary. This report was commissioned by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries to inform decisions about Norway’s continued participation in EU space activities for 2028–2034. It does so by evaluating the benefits for both Norway and the EU of continued Norwegian participation. The report situates the discussion within a broader context, considering not only direct economic gains but also how political, technological and security developments have transformed the conditions for space activities, space policy, and Norway’s role in Europe’s evolving space landscape. Norway is deeply dependent on well-functioning space capacities, both for societal and defence-related purposes. Space-based services have become critical infrastructures with few substitutes, underpinning key sectors of the Norwegian economy, everyday services, public administration, and military systems. The increasing criticality of space is not unique to Norway but reflects the deep embeddedness of satellite-based services in modern societies. At the same time, the politics of space have grown more tense and contested. Space is increasingly embedded in power politics, strategic competition and concerns about resilience. For small states like Norway, the high costs and complexity of space activities mean self-sufficiency is unfeasible, and cooperation necessary. On the civilian side, this cooperation has mainly been oriented towards European cooperation, in the European Union's Space Programme (2021-2027) and in the European Space Agency (ESA). In a changing geopolitical context, the EU has assumed a stronger and clearer role as a security policy actor. Resultingly, its space policies are changing and are now closely tied to the EU’s ambitions for strategic autonomy and a stronger role in security and defence. This shift blurs the distinction between the EU and ESA, and between civilian and military aims and capacities. Closer and more integrated European cooperation on space ties EU member states more closely together but it also sharpens boundaries between the EU and other countries. At the same time, there is a major restructuring under way in how the EU finances and organizes its efforts in the space sector. This backdrop places Norwegian space policy in a new and demanding context. This report examines the consequences of these developments for Norway, and how they change the framework conditions for Norwegian space policy and participation in the EU’s space activities. The report is structured around the following overarching research questions: Where is Europe’s space policy heading? What is Norway’s role in this development? What are the benefits of Norwegian participation in the EU’s space activities? And what are the alternatives to continued Norwegian participation in the EU’s space activities for the period 2028–2034? The report finds that participation in EU space activities (2021-2027) has been highly beneficial to Norway, providing essential services and integration into a broader European ecosystem for technology development, exports and learning. At the same time, the EU also benefits from Norwegian participation: Norway offers niche expertise, unique Arctic capabilities, and northern ground infrastructure that are costly or difficult for other European states to replicate, thereby strengthening European competitiveness and resilience. Looking ahead to 2028–2034, non-participation would weaken Norway’s access to key data, services and information, undermine the position and competitiveness of Norwegian space industry, make an ambitious national space policy harder to pursue, and risk an erosion of space competence. For the EU, it would mean having to replace or go without Norwegian capabilities and resources. For both parties this is a suboptimal outcome.
Norwegian Security Policy: Strategic Choices and Dilemmas in a Time of Turbulence
The project examines how Russia’s war against Ukraine, increased great power rivalry, and uncertainty among allies are shaping Norwegian security policy, and how Norway should adapt to...
War in Europe and French Contributions to European Security
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, several European countries have had to reconsider their security and defense policies. This also applies to France. Although the changes in French security and defense policy do not represent a complete break with previous policy, the threat from the East has now gained increased significance for French defense planning as well. The most important changes in French security and defense policy are related to a shift in its policy towards Russia, increased support for Ukraine, and last but not least, a revised threat assessment and a considerable increase in defense budgets. With Russian aggression and uncertainty regarding the long-term U.S. commitment to European security, France’s focus on strategic autonomy has also gained broader support among European allies.
The votes that can shape European security
2024 will be an important election year on both sides of the Atlantic.President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump are yet again battling...