Publications
France: Able, willing, and leading?
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses France.
Transformative securitization: Rethinking the Copenhagen School in light of COVID-19, climate change, and the war in Ukraine
This article advances securitization theory by introducing the concept of transformative securitization, in which crises are not only framed as existential threats but also as catalysts for reconstituting political orders. Drawing on the Copenhagen School and Hannah Arendt’s notion of natality, the article distinguishes transformative securitization from conservative forms that aim to preserve the status quo. It conceptualizes transformative securitization through three dimensions: agency (bottom-up and participatory), procedure (disruptive yet potentially democratizing), and outcome (yielding durable institutional or normative change). Through empirical illustrations from Denmark and Norway’s responses to COVID-19, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and climate change, the article shows how securitization can both constrain and enable democratic transformation. It finds that while some responses reinforce executive power and narrow deliberative space, others—especially in climate politics—reflect participatory and future-oriented securitizing moves that can reconfigure societal sectors or entire polities. Climate change emerges as a paradigmatic case of transformative securitization, where intergenerational justice and systemic change are driven by civic agency. By bridging crisis and political founding, the concept refines securitization theory’s understanding of extraordinary politics and offers new tools to analyze the democratic potential and pitfalls of security responses in an era of overlapping, urgent predicaments.
Non-Western Visions of International Order
The scholarship on the concept of order has been expanding within international relations. The continuous upheaval of world politics first triggered a broad debate on the resilience of the liberal international order (LIO), which then led to scholarship on alternative conceptions of order, especially outside of the West. This review focuses on this body of research on non-Western views of order. It is structured geographically, taking a tour of scholarship from and on East and Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, South Asia and the Indo-Pacific, and Eurasia. Although each region has its own intellectual traditions, we observe that these views portray the LIO in a less idealized form, exposing its hierarchical and Western-centered nature. However, while pushing for more inclusive and plural arrangements, these critiques have not yet amounted to the articulation of radical alternative ordering projects.
The Gambia Has Decided: A model for intervention, or a missed opportunity?
Recent years have seen increased instances of democratic backsliding across West Africa, particularly through military coups. This Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in collaboration with the African Union (AU), can work proactively together to strengthen democratisation processes. Against this backdrop, this report presents an in-depth case study on The Gambia. In particular, it evaluates the AU- and ECOWAS-led interventions that followed the country’s elections in 2016. In the course of its assessment, the study articulates insights for Africa-led interventions. These draw on an array of tools, including mediation, political missions and military pressure. Another key focus of the report is the changing nature of partnerships between the AU and regional economic communities (RECs) as part of their responses to political crises. This includes examining the extent to which the AU and ECOWAS coordinated efforts to address the constitutional crisis that followed the disputed outcome of the December 2016 polls. The study culminates in a series of key findings. Among these is that the principle of subsidiarity remains ambiguously defined; that coordination between the AU and ECOWAS was uneven and at times duplicative; and that national ownership in The Gambia was insufficiently embedded in the reform process. This suggests that while ECOWAS´ visible and robust intervention was decisive in restoring constitutional order, the AU´s more technical engagement lacked visibility and sustainability. Both actors struggled to align their support in a coherent and mutually reinforcing manner. Over time, this served to reduce how both organisations were able to act as continuous and legitimate actors in the country. These findings offer guidance on how the AU and RECs could partner more effectively to address crises in Africa. Clarifying subsidiarity is a key step. While the term is widely used by the AU and RECs, the key questions of subsidiarity — such as the political dimensions it entails; and how the AU and ECOWAS could jointly address a lack of political will at the member state level — remain unresolved. Other areas of guidance defined in the report include strengthening joint planning and communication; and ensuring that balanced attention is given not only to immediate security concerns, but also longterm governance reform. The study concludes that without deeper institutionalised coordination mechanisms and stronger political will from both continental and national actors, the sustainability of such interventions will remain limited.
The Effectiveness of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)
The report assesses the effectiveness of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), deployed in 2021 to counter the ASWJ insurgency in Cabo Delgado. SAMIM helped reduce insurgent capacity and restore some state presence, but it struggled with mismatched resources, limited host-nation cooperation, and parallel Rwandan operations. The mission never achieved key tasks such as sustained territorial stabilisation, air and maritime support, or long-term capacity-building of Mozambican forces. Political constraints and operational gaps ultimately led to its withdrawal in mid-2024, despite persistent insecurity.
To scenarier for krigen i Ukraina: Hva betyr de for Europa – og hva vil det koste?
Russlands ulovlige angrepskrig i Ukraina har pågått siden 2014, og har ført til store menneskelige og økonomiske tap. Denne studien undersøker de materielle og økonomiske kostnadene for Europa og Norge dersom Russland vinner fram med sin krigføring, versus en situasjon hvor Ukraina igjen bringes på offensiven og tvinger Russland til fredsslutning. Vi tror ikke på noe gjennombrudd for president Trumps forsøk på forhandlinger og en diplomatisk løsning på krigen i Ukraina. Russland har ikke vist reell vilje til kompromiss, og fremsetter fortsatt sine maksimumskrav, som i praksis betyr ukrainsk underkastelse. Krigen vil derfor trolig fortsette som en utmattelseskrig, der de to landenes økonomiske utvikling, og utviklingen ved fronten, vil avgjøre utfallet. Denne rapporten skisserer to mulige scenarier for den videre utvikling i krigen, hvordan de kan bli realisert, og hvilke konsekvenser de kan ha for europeisk sikkerhet og forsvarsbehov. Rapporten sikter mot å illustrere for norske beslutningstakere hvilke grunnleggende økonomiske og sikkerhetspolitiske valg den russiske angrepskrigen i Ukraina utløser, og hvordan ulike utfall i krigen kan påvirke våre egne sikkerhetsbehov og forsvarsutgifter. Situasjonen stiller Europa overfor krav til resolutt handling. Hovedspørsmålene vi stiller i rapporten er hva som skal til for at Russland eller Ukraina seirer militært: Hva koster det Europa og allierte i økt forsvarsinnsats dersom Russland seirer eller lykkes å nøytralisere Ukraina militært og politisk (Scenario 1), og hvilken kostnad det har å gjøre Ukraina i stand til å motstå russiske angrep og gjenvinne muligheten til begrensede motoffensiver (Scenario 2). Rapporten er skrevet av ledende eksperter innen sikkerhetspolitikk, militær doktrine og økonomi. Forfatternes tilknyttede institusjoner er ikke ansvarlige for innholdet, det er forfatterne selv som er ansvarlige for analysen og konklusjonene i rapporten.
Italy: Transatlantic Loyalty First
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Italy.
UK: Leading politically but militarily questionable
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses the UK.
Belgium: Committed in Principle, Constrained in Practice
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Belgium.
Denmark: High on will, low on military capabilities
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Denmark.