Publications
Poland as the Coalition’s logistical backbone: Powering the front
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Poland.
The Czech Republic: From a High-Profile Supporter to a Low-Profile Abstainer?
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses The Czech Republic.
Norway: Solid political engagement, military reluctance
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Norway.
Estonia: Strong and Early Support, but Conditions Apply
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Estonia.
Sweden: Politically Willing, but Militarily Constrained
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Sweden.
Finland: Capable but Informed by Frontline Realism
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Finland.
Latvia: Strongly Committed, Modestly Equipped
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Latvia.
Canada: Willing but unable
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses Canada.
France: Able, willing, and leading?
In the Multinational Force Ukraine series of policy briefs leading experts from allied countries assess key factors for participation in the Multinational Force Ukraine. This includes the political willingness of allies to deploy troops—on the ground, in the air, or at sea—to establish a military presence in or around Ukraine. They also examine the conditions for such deployments to occur (before, during, or after peace negotiations), the roles these forces would be expected to perform (defensive or offensive), the red lines imposed by national governments, and the specific capabilities each country could realistically contribute. This brief analyses France.
Transformative securitization: Rethinking the Copenhagen School in light of COVID-19, climate change, and the war in Ukraine
This article advances securitization theory by introducing the concept of transformative securitization, in which crises are not only framed as existential threats but also as catalysts for reconstituting political orders. Drawing on the Copenhagen School and Hannah Arendt’s notion of natality, the article distinguishes transformative securitization from conservative forms that aim to preserve the status quo. It conceptualizes transformative securitization through three dimensions: agency (bottom-up and participatory), procedure (disruptive yet potentially democratizing), and outcome (yielding durable institutional or normative change). Through empirical illustrations from Denmark and Norway’s responses to COVID-19, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and climate change, the article shows how securitization can both constrain and enable democratic transformation. It finds that while some responses reinforce executive power and narrow deliberative space, others—especially in climate politics—reflect participatory and future-oriented securitizing moves that can reconfigure societal sectors or entire polities. Climate change emerges as a paradigmatic case of transformative securitization, where intergenerational justice and systemic change are driven by civic agency. By bridging crisis and political founding, the concept refines securitization theory’s understanding of extraordinary politics and offers new tools to analyze the democratic potential and pitfalls of security responses in an era of overlapping, urgent predicaments.