Attentatet i Bagdad kan virke mot sin hensikt
Det er forståelig at USA ønsket å ta ut Soleimani og Muhandis, to nøkkelpersoner i Irans transnasjonale nettverk av motstandsgrupper. Attentatet var imidlertid ikke nødvendigvis et strategisk riktig valg, og kan få en rekke utilsiktede konsekvenser.
New frameworks for Norwegian security and defence policy (TEOTEK)
This project aims to employ diverse theoretical perspectives to enhance our understanding of the development of new technology, and its consequences and implications for Norwegian secu...
Attentatet i Bagdad: Farlig og feilkalkulert
Den 3. januar kom nyheten om at generalmajor Qasem Soleimani ble drept i et amerikansk droneangrep i Bagdad. Ifølge president Trump handlet USA «for å stoppe en krig, ikke for å starte en krig», men angrepet bør heller ses i forlengelse av Trump-administrasjonens maximum pressure-strategi, som har økt konflikten mellom Iran og USA.
Debating terrorism in a political transition: Journalism and democracy in Tunisia
In March 2015, in the midst of a political transition, Tunisia was rocked by a terrorist attack at the Bardo Museum in downtown Tunis in which 21 people were killed. How did Tunisian journalists manage the tension between a heightened sense of insecurity and the country’s uncertain democratic development? This article analyses journalistic commentary on the causes and implications of terrorism four years into the transition sparked by the Arab uprisings. It provides an empirically nuanced perspective on the role of journalism in political transitions, focusing on journalists as arbitrators in public debate. We argue that influential Tunisian journalists fell back on interpretive schema from the Ben Ali era when they tried to make sense of the Bardo attack, thus facilitating the authoritarian drift of the Tunisian government at the time. They actively contributed to the non-linearity of a political transition, despite enjoying real freedom of speech.
Japan and Arctic Security
This chapter focuses on what Arctic security means to Japan and how Japan handles the security dimension in its three-spoke approach to the Arctic, involving economic, political, and scientific factors. The chapter begins by addressing the changing understandings of what Arctic security entails. What are the historic and contemporary understandings of Arctic security? It then embarks on a discussion of Japan’s approach to the Arctic demonstrating how security fits in at traditional and nontraditional and national and international levels. How does Japan convey its position as a non-Arctic state concerned about security developments in the Arctic? Analysis is based on recent statements and activities stemming from Japan’s official Arctic Policy (2015), as well as developments in the political, research, and business sectors since 2008. The chapter concludes that, while traditional security issues in the Arctic are not the explicit framing of Japan’s Arctic policy and engagement, they do play an implicit role both on paper and in practice.
Between vulnerability and risk? Mental health in UK counter-terrorism
The relationship between terrorism and mental health has been a scholarly concern for decades. So far, the literature has concentrated on the relationship between terrorism and diagnosable disorders, and the prevalence of certain psychological traits among terrorist offenders. Meanwhile, the incorporation of perspectives regarding mental health in the operational space of counter-terrorism has been largely ignored. This article explores three current approaches to individual mental health in UK counter-terrorism: the use of ‘appropriate adults’ in terrorism-related cases; the ‘mental health hubs’ introduced in 2016; and counter-terrorism-related risk and vulnerability assessments. The article argues that in light of the UK’s new counter-terrorism strategy, these practices show an increasing merger between conceptualisations of vulnerabilities and risks in how UK counter-terrorism approaches mental health.
Political Opportunities for the Extreme Right in Georgia
Over the past several years, right-wing extremists have begun to proliferate in Georgia and their visibility has noticeably increased. More recently, far right groups even announced plans to form a joint party, the National Front, which will “take part in absolutely all political processes.” This policy brief discusses whether there are favorable political opportunities for right-wing extremist actors in Georgia to mobilize. The legal system of the country includes laws that restrict extreme right rhetoric and action. However, an analysis of Georgia’s political space shows that right-wing extremist groups are indirectly supported, or at least not openly condemned, by the ruling party and other political actors. In addition, extreme right opinions largely coincide with general public attitudes, meaning that there are significant discursive opportunities for mobilization. After discussing the factors that contribute to potential mobilization opportunities for right-wing extremism, the brief presents policy options to counter this process.
Georgia's Emerging Far Right
Ethnonationalism has been as common in Georgia as in other post-Soviet countries, but the far-right social movement has especially been gaining traction for the past five years, gradually becoming larger, more diverse, and more violent. The parliamentary elections approaching in 2020 create a window of opportunity for far-right actors to gain access to mainstream politics.
The “Right” Side of Facebook: Online Mobilization of the Georgian Extreme Right
In recent years, extreme-right groups have become increasingly visible in the republic of Georgia. In several cases they have managed to bring exclusion-oriented issues to the agenda, occupying public space and restricting opportunities for liberal groups and human rights activists. Although this has led to growing concern in political circles and civil society, there has been little in-depth research. Drawing on social movement theory, I investigate the role of digital media, specifically, Facebook, in mobilization. The analysis rests on 8,069 Facebook posts of four publicly active extreme-right groups, as well as 18 in-depth interviews with activists and experts. Frame analysis shows that extreme right groups try to align their narratives with public opinion, especially, homo- and transphobic and anti-immigration attitudes, as well as public distrust in political institutions, NGOs, and the media. Social network analysis, in turn, shows that the online network of the Georgian extreme right is decentralized, marked with a battle for influences in the emerging movement. In this loose network, actors with less radical and more populist ideology seem more central, whereas those with more extreme ideologies are more peripheral. Overall, the paper suggests that, given the lack of access to political institutions and mainstream media channels, extreme right groups in Georgia largely rely on Facebook to spread their narrative, garner support and mobilize for action.
Georgian Pride World Wide:” Extreme Right Mobilization in Georgia
During the past few years, Georgia has witnessed an increased visibility of extreme right groups. On many occasions, these groups managed to bring exclusion-oriented issues to the agenda and at occupying public space, thus restricting opportunities for liberal groups and human rights activists. Even though the recent proliferation of extreme right groups has led to growing concern among political circles and civil society, these groups have not been researched in depth. To fill in this gap in literature, this thesis aims to understand how extreme right groups in Georgia mobilize. The thesis rests on social movement theory, according to which political opportunities and organizational resources influence the way movements frame their views and take action. This thesis demonstrates that, overall, extreme right mobilization opportunities in Georgia are limited. Yet, while the legal system of the country restricts extreme right mobilization and the political space only offers narrow opportunities to participate, the public opinion generally supports exclusion-focused policies. The fact that Georgian extreme right groups have limited organizational resources confines their ability to meet this public demand effectively. Yet, they try to capitalize on the insecurities prevalent in the society, adapting their strategies, frames, and actions accordingly.