WEBINAR: Understanding the global far right: lessons from India
How global is the far right?
The role of the UN Security Council in cybersecurity: international peace and security in the digital age
At the 75th anniversary of the United Nations, the UN Security Council is faced with difficult questions about its efficacy, relevance and legitimacy. The leading powers and the permanent members (P5) of the Security Council – China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA – are drawn into a heavy contest over the world order. Power lines are (to be) drawn in an increasingly digital, interconnected and multi-stakeholder society. So far, despite the language from heads of states, global media houses and from leaders of international organizations including NATO and the UN, none of the P5 countries have brought cyber to the UNSC. Other countries – for instance, Lithuania and the Netherlands – have considered introducing cybersecurity issues in the Council, but no action has followed. One of the most recent members-elect, Estonia, has pledged to take the issue up. To stay relevant and act up on its responsibility for international peace and security, the Security Council will have to establish itself vis-à-vis cyber issues. The goal of this chapter is to examine why and how. To what extent do questions pertaining to digital threats and cybersecurity fall within the mandate of the Council and what could it address given the politically tense times among the P5.
WEBINAR: Jihad in the Sahel: Actors, developments and context
Who are the jihadi insurgents, why are they gaining ground, and what are the likely future developments in the Sahel?
Meningsfull,menneskelig, kontroll?
Denne rapproten tar for seg konseptet «meningsfull menneskelig kontroll» som har dukket opp som det førende temaet i debatten rundt autonomi og våpensystemer. For å belyse spørsmålet om hva menneskelig kontroll er, hvordan det bør forstås og hvordan man kan «sikre» det må vi tenke nytt rundt forholdet mellom mennesker og maskiner. Ikke bare se maskiner som vertøy som mennesker kan bruke av fri vilje, men snarere se på autonome systemer i sin helhet der de gjensidige relasjonene mellom mennesker og maskin former hverandre og gir opphav til nye måter å tenke og handle på. Altså at både mennesker og maskiner forandres i møte mellom dem. Gitt en slik vinkling åpner man også for muligheten for å belyse dagens debatt om autonomi og kontroll på nye måter. Ikke minst at den utøvende fasen av en operasjon, liv og død-avgjørelser, er et for snevert nedslagsfelt hvis vi skal forstå hva kontroll er og hvordan det utøves. Vikitgheten av dette blir illustrert via en gjennomgang av prosessene og praksisene rundt militær targeting. En prosess der militæret definerer mål og beslutter operasjoner. Gjennom denne illustrasjonen ser man at beslutningstaking ikke bare er ett valg gjort på et bestemt tidspunkt, som avgjørelsen om å sende et missil mot et bestemt mål, men noe som er avledet av en rekke valg gjort over tid. Dette åpner opp for å se på beslutningstaking og dermed også kontroll som et resultat av en rekke praksiser og prosesser, distribuert over flere faser, mellom diverse elementer, der noen valg blir foretrukket fremfor andre. Et slikt fokus setter søkelys på de mer sammensatte og komplekse teknologiske systemene for datainnhenting, analyse og lagring, som spiller en nøkkelrolle i utformingen av valg og beslutninger, men som ofte blir neglisjert. Hvis vi bedre forstår hvordan disse systemene fungerer, hvordan de produserer kunnskap, hva de legger vekt på og hva de utelater, kan vi øke vår forståelse av kontroll og bedre «sikre» de etiske, legale og strategisk-politiske sider ved økende autonomisering av militære teknologier.
Renewable energy and geopolitics: A review
This article reviews the literature on the geopolitics of renewable energy. It finds that while the roots of this literature can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s, most of it has been published from 2010 onwards. The following aggregate conclusions are extracted from the literature: renewable energy has many advantages over fossil fuels for international security and peace; however, renewable energy is thought to exacerbate security risks and geopolitical tensions related to critical materials and cybersecurity; former hydrocarbon exporters will likely be the greatest losers from the energy transition. Many of the reviewed publications share some weaknesses: a failure to define “geopolitics”; an unwarranted assumption that very little has been published in the field previously; limited use of established forecasting, scenario-building or foresight methodologies; a lack of recognition of the complexity of the field; a lack of theorisation. Most authors do not distinguish between the geopolitical risks associated with different types of renewable energy, and only a few distinguish clearly between the geopolitics of the transitional phase and the geopolitics of a post-energy transition world. A disproportionately large part of the literature is dedicated to critical materials and cybersecurity, while only a small part concerns the decline of former fossil fuel powers. Among those publications that do discuss the decline of fossil fuels, there is also an over-focus on oil producers and a lack of attention to the countries that rely heavily on coal, for example Australia, China, Germany, Indonesia, Poland and the United States.
The Shifting Boundaries of Nordic Defence Cooperation
Nordic security and defence cooperation is shifting with the rapid rise and expansion of European defence cooperation. Spanning industrial collaboration, capability development, training and operations, planning, as well as other strategic measures, this new European momentum has manifested itself in several new multilateral frameworks, including the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Framework Nations Concept (FNC), the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) However, with so many parallel initiatives emerging, there is a risk they could undermine each other and become a drain on scarce resources.This is the key issue this research paper addresses. It takes stock of recent developments in Nordic defence cooperation, before situating Norway within current European developments and highlighting some of the convergences and possibilities a stronger European defence agenda may bring.
Localising ‘radicalisation’: Risk assessment practices in Greece and the United Kingdom
This article juxtaposes anti-radicalisation policy in the United Kingdom, one of the pioneers in the field, with Greece, one of the latecomers. Drawing on localisation theory, our aim is to understand how ‘common knowledge’ of radicalisation and counter-radicalisation has materialised in the United Kingdom and Greece by exploring the development and use of radicalisation-related risk and vulnerability assessment tools. We argue that the radicalisation ‘knowledge’ was localised more seamlessly in the United Kingdom, which can be attributed to the country’s ‘norm producer’ status on the field of European counter-radicalisation. By contrast, the ‘knowledge’ was subjected to significant ‘re-framing’ and ‘stretching’ to fit with the Greek context. This is associated with the country’s ‘norm adopter’ status on the field of European counter-radicalisation, as well as with a ‘spill-over effect’ from a national context of deeply polarising and contentious counter-terrorism policies. We maintain that these localisation processes reveal two distinct assemblages of governing radicalisation.
Nordic perspectives on European security: Norway
How does Norway relate to the various new European defence cooperation formats? Which states are Norway coordinating with when engaging in these projects? Is there unexploited potential for common Nordic initiatives within the European formats? Or do traditional security relationships still take precedence? These are the questions discussed in this chapter