Publications
Morocco’s climate policy at a turning point under the EU CBAM
Morocco’s climate leadership is now tested by the European Union’s (EU) Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which shifts attention from ambition to verifiable industrial performance. Despite strong renewable efforts, the carbon intensity of electricity and gaps in monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) readiness expose exporters to rising compliance pressure. The next phase of CBAM will also affect small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), many of which lack reporting and decarbonization capacity. Morocco now faces a turning point where climate ambition must translate into systems that support export competitiveness. A focused set of reforms can strengthen energy access, data credibility, and institutional coordination for a CBAM-ready transition. - Improve access to low-carbon electricity and streamline self-generation - Accelerate development of an MRV system with clear institutional roles, publicly available emission factors and reliable carbon emissions accounting tools. - Support SMEs with targeted CBAM-readiness tools, training and finance. - Consider gradual domestic carbon pricing to reduce CBAM costs and fund industrial decarbonization.
Borders Ending Nowhere: The Geopolitical Imaginaries and Practices of Russia’s Spheres of Interest in Africa
Russia has been involved in Africa since Tsarist times, but its involvement has ebbed and flowed. Nonetheless, the idea of Africa as an open political landscape in which Russia could act as a great power has been relatively persistent, often in connection with the domestic resurfacing of civilisational discourses on Russian exceptionalism. Recently, there has been much concern in the West about the expansion of Russian projection in Africa, with some suggesting that Moscow is establishing a sphere of influence. Our analysis of Russia’s geopolitical imagination and its subsequent practices does not lead us to conclude that a deliberate attempt to establish a genuine sphere of influence is underway. Instead, we see an opportunistic endeavour to assert and shape a geographically continuous sphere of interest (Russian: sfera interesov), negotiating with local partners forms of collaboration that reflect and prompt change in the international system.
A Pathway to Security in the MENA: Integrating Subregional Electricity Markets
Despite being among the richest regions in energy, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is facing security and electricity crises. Grids are beset with technical challenges and gas dependence, and energy poverty is high amidst conflict. Integrated cross-border electricity markets can alleviate power shortages through trade. Yet MENA’s three subregional power markets are underutilized, trading 2% of electricity generated. This policy brief argues that governments must integrate each of the three MENA subregional grids into electricity markets, expanding to Iran and Türkiye. This is the most practical pathway and the first phase towards a MENA-wide integrated electricity market. States must undertake technical, institutional, and market reforms to transform MENA’s subregional grids into resilient, efficient and low-carbon integrated grids offering short-term stability and long-term security.
Meaning-Making in Times of Trouble: COVID-19 Conspiracies on Russian Telegram
Many Russians harbor distrust toward government institutions and official information. Amid the uncertainties of the COVID-19 pandemic, they turned to social media for advice. This article analyzes how the Russian-language Telegram channel “COVID Resistance” contributed to the process of making sense of the situation. Based on a close reading of selected posts, we reconstruct four conspiratorial narratives promoted by this channel: “toxic vaccines,” “fascistoid restrictions,” “coronavirus as a hoax,” and “besieged nation.” We find that these narratives, despite often contradicting each other, served as a form of meaning-making, offering explanations that helped ordinary people navigate the crisis.
Three Books on Aleksei Navalny
(This essay is in Norwegian): In the wake of Alexei Navalny’s death in February 2024, several books have been published about the opposition leader. This essay will address three of these: "Patriot" (2024), written by Navalny himself, "Aleksej Navalnyj. Å drepe en fremtid (2024)" [Alexei Navalny. Killing a Future], written by John Færseth, and "Murder in the Gulag. The Life and Death of Alexei Navalny" (2024), written by John Sweeney. These are not academic books, and they are not written for an academic audience. How do these books contribute to the study of Russia and international relations? "Patriot" sheds light on two important themes: ideas one can be punished for in today’s authoritarian Russia and what this punishment can, in the worst case, entail. The books about Navalny written by Færseth and Sweeney are interesting examples of how Western actors articulate Russia. Sweeney in particular, draws on a black/white, villain/hero perspective and thus contributes to cementing the idea of Russia as the West’s ‘other’.
The power of standards in European Union digital governance
• This policy brief situates standardisation projects in the EU within global regulatory power, highlighting implications for markets, innovation, and global governance. • Standards for the production and distribution of digital products in the EU are technopolitical instruments that shape authority, legitimacy, and power, rather than neutral administrative tools for ensuring security and quality. • The EU’s regulatory power extends beyond European borders, intensifying debates about regulatory overreach, where public-interest regulation is often framed as protectionist and consequently rejected or simply ignored by major tech companies. • Standards should remain contestable, certification regimes subject to robust oversight, and expertise broadened beyond narrow technocratic communities.
Reconciling Indonesia’s Climate Ambition: Who Gets to Shape the Policymaking Process?
Indonesia entered COP30 in Belém, Brazil, with more ambitious pledges, but the governance that produces those commitments has changed little. Successive Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) show greater ambition on paper yet remain shaped by a narrow technocratic circle, limited public participation, and growth-first economic assumptions. This expert-centered approach reveals a persistent tension between development priorities and the Paris Agreement’s goals. To strengthen credibility, ambition, and delivery before the next pledge-and-review cycle, Indonesia should: • Expand NDC involvement beyond the existing expert group. • Build a climate action coalition to coordinate national and local efforts. • Invest in capacity building while maintaining national control. • Publish comprehensive implementation roadmaps with well-defined targets and milestones. • Reduce reliance on FOLU and land-use sinks by accelerating energy and industrial decarbonization. • Rebuild strategic climate diplomacy to guide focused coalitions at COPs.
Når rompolitikk blir sikkerhetspolitikk: Norsk deltakelse i EUs romaktiviteter
The report is in Norwegian but it has an English summary. This report was commissioned by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries to inform decisions about Norway’s continued participation in EU space activities for 2028–2034. It does so by evaluating the benefits for both Norway and the EU of continued Norwegian participation. The report situates the discussion within a broader context, considering not only direct economic gains but also how political, technological and security developments have transformed the conditions for space activities, space policy, and Norway’s role in Europe’s evolving space landscape. Norway is deeply dependent on well-functioning space capacities, both for societal and defence-related purposes. Space-based services have become critical infrastructures with few substitutes, underpinning key sectors of the Norwegian economy, everyday services, public administration, and military systems. The increasing criticality of space is not unique to Norway but reflects the deep embeddedness of satellite-based services in modern societies. At the same time, the politics of space have grown more tense and contested. Space is increasingly embedded in power politics, strategic competition and concerns about resilience. For small states like Norway, the high costs and complexity of space activities mean self-sufficiency is unfeasible, and cooperation necessary. On the civilian side, this cooperation has mainly been oriented towards European cooperation, in the European Union's Space Programme (2021-2027) and in the European Space Agency (ESA). In a changing geopolitical context, the EU has assumed a stronger and clearer role as a security policy actor. Resultingly, its space policies are changing and are now closely tied to the EU’s ambitions for strategic autonomy and a stronger role in security and defence. This shift blurs the distinction between the EU and ESA, and between civilian and military aims and capacities. Closer and more integrated European cooperation on space ties EU member states more closely together but it also sharpens boundaries between the EU and other countries. At the same time, there is a major restructuring under way in how the EU finances and organizes its efforts in the space sector. This backdrop places Norwegian space policy in a new and demanding context. This report examines the consequences of these developments for Norway, and how they change the framework conditions for Norwegian space policy and participation in the EU’s space activities. The report is structured around the following overarching research questions: Where is Europe’s space policy heading? What is Norway’s role in this development? What are the benefits of Norwegian participation in the EU’s space activities? And what are the alternatives to continued Norwegian participation in the EU’s space activities for the period 2028–2034? The report finds that participation in EU space activities (2021-2027) has been highly beneficial to Norway, providing essential services and integration into a broader European ecosystem for technology development, exports and learning. At the same time, the EU also benefits from Norwegian participation: Norway offers niche expertise, unique Arctic capabilities, and northern ground infrastructure that are costly or difficult for other European states to replicate, thereby strengthening European competitiveness and resilience. Looking ahead to 2028–2034, non-participation would weaken Norway’s access to key data, services and information, undermine the position and competitiveness of Norwegian space industry, make an ambitious national space policy harder to pursue, and risk an erosion of space competence. For the EU, it would mean having to replace or go without Norwegian capabilities and resources. For both parties this is a suboptimal outcome.
Handlingsrom og norsk støtte til kvinner, fred og sikkerhet i Afghanistan og Sudan
This article examines how Norwegian support for the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in Afghanistan and Sudan is affected by factors such as war, humanitarian crises and democratic decline. In the article, the authors look more closely at the factors that influence the support provided, and how the relevant actors respond to changes in the framework conditions. The authors find that the work is affected by changes in the political space, including armed conflict and democratic decline. The situation is somewhat different in the two countries, but in both cases, the absence of official cooperation with the countries’ central authorities requires Norway to take a more flexible approach to the WPS work and to direct more of its efforts toward the local level. In both Sudan and Afghanistan, there are local variations in terms of humanitarian access and willingness to work with the WPS agenda. In other words, there is room for Norway to continue its work to support the implementation the WPS agenda in these contexts, although in countries affected by crisis and conflict this often must be done differently than in countries where Norway has an embassy or official cooperation with the local authorities.