Research project
Jihadist Governance in the Sahel (JIGOV-Sahel)
Events
In spite of concerted international and regional engagement to contain the spread of jihadist insurgencies, the security situation continues to deteriorate in West Africa’s Sahel region. This project analyses jihadist insurgent governance in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria.
Jihadist insurgents are usually considered to be "Islamist terrorists" who rule through brutal violence and who finance their activities through criminal networks. Rarely are they considered to ‘govern’. However, scattered evidence from the Sahel suggests that contrary to conventional wisdom, the picture is not so one-dimensional. Our ongoing research suggests that jihadist insurgents do govern, and the way they do so varies between groups. They may use coercion, provide minimal services like mobile courts, intervene strategically in rights-based conflicts over resources, and develop social bonds with communities.
This project will undertake across and within-case comparison of a number of understudied jihadist insurgencies in the region. In doing so, it aims to challenge dominant narratives about jihadist insurgencies, and contribute to building a better evidence-base to inform policymakers and practitioners. Thus, the ambition is to significantly shift the state of the art on rebel governance.
JIGOV-Sahel will incorporate bottom-up perspectives from local communities through extensive fieldwork and close partnerships with local actors. This will ensure that the project remains grounded in the lived experiences, priorities and knowledge of those most directly affected by conflict, insecurity and governance challenges in the Sahel.
The project findings will be carefully disseminated to a wide range of stakeholders, including local peacebuilding and development actors, policymakers, civil society organisations, and the general public in Norway, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria. To maximise both academic and societal impact, the researchers in this project will produce a series of academic articles for publication in a Special Issue of a peer-reviewed journal, as well as a book. In addition, they will prepare policy briefs and organise seminars and workshops in both policy and academic settings. Finally, they will develop a photo essay and organise exhibitions to communicate their findings to broader audiences in accessible and engaging ways.
Access the online exhibition 'Lived realities on the frontlines of the Sahel' here!
Other relevant NUPI projects:
The project is funded by the Research Council of Norway, FRIPRO.
Project Manager
Participants
External
- ARGA represented by Dr. Abdoul Cissé
- University of Oxford, represented by Professor Stathis Kalyvas
- Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), represented by Dr. Idayat Hassan
- African Security Sector Network (ASSN), represented by Dr. Niagelé Bagayoko
Articles
New publications
When jihadists govern: Lessons across the Sahel cases
Fifteen years of international engagement have failed to halt the rise of jihadist insurgency in the Sahel. The Jihadist Governance in the Sahel (JIGOV-Sahel) research project shows that neither the absence of the state nor the insurgents’ ideological commitment alone is the cause. The state is present in ways that generate resistance, and jihadists govern because they fulfil functions the state does not. Norwegian and international strategies should move away from a military-first response and from the restoration of the same state, and towards assistance that strengthens state legitimacy, services, and rule of law in the daily lives of citizens.
Replacing the state
Military action alone is insufficient to defeat jihadist insurgency in northeast Nigeria; ISWAP persists by functioning as a proto-state providing justice and services. Insurgents fill the vacuum left by the state’s failure to provide security and infrastructure in rural areas. Reclaiming authority requires re-placing insurgent governance archi-tectures with predictable state administration. Rapid restoration of services and civilian protection in liberated areas are vital to preventing insurgent return. Reintegration must address returnee expectations shaped by their experience of alternative rule. Note: An updated version was published 8 June 2026.
Jihadism and Social Cohesion
This is a chapter in the book 'Routledge Handbook of Social Cohesion in Africa'. This chapter explores how jihadist movements in the Sahel both erode and construct social cohesion. It demonstrates how insurgents exploit weak governance and social fragmentation while building exclusionary forms of order and authority.
Sahel – The Perfect Storm
The Sahel is the borderland of 3 million square kilometres between the Sahara Desert and the African savannah and forest lands further south. Much of this huge area is inhospitable. Insurgencies are common, as are migration and smuggling, jobs being as rare here as effective government intervention–state power extends only fitfully, and the region resists attempts to subdue militants, people-traffickers, nomadic herders or anyone excluded from power. The Western Sahel’s fragile states face growing popular discontent, complicated by both climate change and military intervention by France and other powers. Mali is the epicentre of the Sahel crisis: Morten Bøås charts the history of Mali and its fragile neighbours, identifying their current frailty as unsettled states, without legitimate social contracts or political consensus. This in turn has generated competing identities and economic interests, which spill over into resource conflicts over grazing, water, mineral reserves or smuggling routes. Such local contests have been manipulated by elites intent on their own preservation, and appropriated by jihadi insurgents eager to integrate into local communities. What will happen if all the ingredients of this perfect storm coalesce? What are the ramifications for the Sahel, its neighbours, Europe and the wider world?
Reviewing Jihadist Governance in the Sahel
The ways in which jihadist insurgents in the Sahel govern is rarely considered in the academic literature. They have often been portrayed as ‘Islamic terrorists’, who achieve their objectives by using brutal force against the civilian population and who finance their activities through criminal networks and activities. However, scattered empirical evidence reveals a different picture. Jihadist insurgents, like other insurgent groups, often use a variety of strategies to rule territory and populations. The scale, character and form of how such groups govern differs not only between countries but also at the sub-national level within the same group. Nevertheless, until recently jihadist insurgent governance in Africa and particularly the Sahel region has largely been overlooked. This synthesis reviews the existing literature on jihadist governance in West Africa, with a particular emphasis on the understudied region of the Sahel. The review is organised as follows: first, we clarify key concepts and provide definitions. Second, we provide a brief overview of Islam and politics in the Sahel, contextualising the rise of Salafist-jihadism as well as historical cases of jihadist governance. Third, we provide a brief overview of the literature and synthesise the existing research on jihadist insurgent governance in the Sahel. Fourth, we examine some key cases of jihadist governance in northern Mali, Nigeria and the Liptako-Gourma region straddling Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Finally, we conclude by summarising our findings, discussing the implications for the study of civil war and insurgency and consider avenues for future research.
Explaining the failure of internationally-supported defence and security reforms in Sahelian states
In response to the crisis in the Sahel, myriad programmes have been set up with the aim of improving the performance of the defence and security forces in the region. These programmes are often run or supported by international partners. Yet, as the security situation in the region worsens, questions have been raised about whether these programmes are relevant and effective. In this article, we will argue that most of the programmes designed to build the capacities of, restructure or reform the armed forces in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have failed to grasp that these security systems function on a fundamentally hybrid basis, with a combination of – and often a clash between – legal and rational approaches, on the one hand, and informal dynamics, on the other, and that this can often hinder implementation of reforms. This article is part of the NUPI led JIGOV project.
L’architecture de sécurité intérieure burkinabé face à la gestion d’une crise multidimensionnelle
The military response has been the main focus to address the multidimensional crisis that the Sahel has been going through since 2012. However, it is equally important to look at the internal security forces' role in addressing insecurity. In this regard, Burkina Faso represents a particularly interesting field of lessons. Faced with the spillover of the Malian crisis on its soil and the emergence of endogenous violence, Burkina Faso is faced with substantial security challenges. Therefore, the country has been forced to rethink its approaches to defence policy, fight against terrorism and sub-regional security, and its conception of public security in a context where threats are now both local and external. Community policing has been placed at the core of Burkina Faso’s security approach.
The Sahel’s jihadists don’t all govern alike: context matters
The way jihadist insurgents in the Sahel governs differs between but also within groups. Jihadists do not follow strict ideological templates for imposing their rule or rely only on the use of violence. They continuously adapt the manner in which they govern in response to internal factional dynamics and pressure from state and non-state actors. They also respond to local politics and conflicts.
Rebel governance? A literature review of Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province
The literature on rebel governance has fundamentally challenged the idea that ‘governance’ is the sole prerogative of ‘government’. Despite important advances over the past decade, studies have largely addressed rebel governance from an ‘institutionalist’ approach. This review seeks to go beyond an ‘institutionalist’ approach, by understanding ‘governance’ as the ‘whole set of practices and norms that govern daily life in a specific territory’. Drawing on a thorough review of literature on Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), this working paper analyses five under-examined independent variables that shape rebel governance in Nigeria’s north-east and Niger: illegitimate state practices, community resilience, and cohesion, external counterinsurgency actions, ‘big men’, and ideology.
Project Manager
Events
Participants
External
- ARGA represented by Dr. Abdoul Cissé
- University of Oxford, represented by Professor Stathis Kalyvas
- Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), represented by Dr. Idayat Hassan
- African Security Sector Network (ASSN), represented by Dr. Niagelé Bagayoko