The Arctic Council and US domestic policymaking
One widely recognized achievement of the Arctic Council and its various working groups has been the production of collectively generated assessments on Arctic problems. Assessment reports such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) provide an important baseline of shared knowledge for making collective circumpolar policy recommendations. But how does the knowledge produced through Arctic Council working groups figure into the policymaking of the Arctic states? This is an important question for understanding Arctic politics and the relationship between national decisionmaking and international relations more generally. Much of what the Arctic Council produces is in the form of recommendations, declarations of intent, and commitments to "best practices" in areas of shared interest and activity. While in recent years the Council has produced three binding agreements covering specific functional areas—search and rescue (2011), oil pollution preparedness and response (2013),and science cooperation (2017)—much ongoing Arctic collaborative work falls outside of these areas. This policy brief explores how science/policy outputs of and discussions at the Arctic Council fit into the Arctic political discourse of the USA, with an emphasis on key actors within the executive branch: the White House, the Department of the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
Kampen om Europa
EUs idéhistoriske fundament ble bygget etter andre verdenskrig for å unngå en slik krig for all fremtid. Den franske utenriksministeren Robert Schuman startet EU-prosjektet ved å samordne de militært relevante europeiske kull- og stålindustriene, og innsatsen var allerede fra starten motivert av ønsket om fred og sikkerhet på kontinentet. Det var også for rollen som fredsprosjekt at EU fikk den kontroversielle fredsprisen i 2012. Selv om sikkerhet har vært sentralt i tenkningen om EU, har sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk vært «den stygge andungen» i forsøkene på tettere integrasjon. EU er gradvis blitt mer integrert gjennom traktater, men sikkerhetspolitisk samarbeid er blitt nedprioritert. Det har sin naturlige forklaring i at saksområdet har vært krevende å samordne. Sikring av ytre grenser og forsvar av territorium har vært kjernen av hva det vil si å være en suveren stat. Europa er et nasjonalstatens kontinent, tross EU.
Territorialstatens tilstand i dagens Midtøsten
Hvordan forstå Midtøsten i dag? Til tross for et enormt litterært landskap som forsøker å belyse denne komplekse regionen, er dette et spørsmål man ikke bør ta lett på. Dette bokessayet diskuterer hvordan de tre bøkene Brennpunkt Midtøsten: Byene som prisme (Butenschøn & Maktabi 2018), Fra opprør til kaos: Midtøsten etter den arabiske våren (Nordenson 2018) og Israel: Historie, politikk og samfunn (Heian-Engdal 2018) bidrar til vår forståelse av Midtøsten i dag. Selv om bøkene har ulike hovedfokus, har de til felles at de beskriver og analyser tilstanden til en rekke av regionens territorialstater. Selv om begreper som suverenitet og territoriell integritet ikke nødvendigvis gir mening i regionen i dag, redegjør bøkene for hvorfor det likevel ikke ser ut til at vi kommer til å se noen endringer i eksisterende statsdannelser i tiden som kommer.
Farlige forbindelser?
Den påståtte koblingen mellom franske høyrenasjonalister og Kreml er overdrevet. Men de felles interessene er der.
Participatory Democracy and Evidence-based Decision Making at the Local Level in Ukraine
Finding a European response to Huawei’s 5G ambitions
This policy brief suggests that European countries should institute national reviewing boards overseen by intelligence agencies to vet Huawei equipment. If that is not feasible due to a lack of resources or capabilities especially among smaller countries, European governments should consider pooling resources and create a common reviewing board. This would also prevent duplication of efforts on national levels. European authorities should also demand from Huawei to clearly separate its international from its domestic business operations in order to further reduce the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of European mobile networks.
Islam Keeping Violent Jihadism at Bay in Times of Daesh: State Religious Institutions in Lebanon, Morocco and Saudi Arabia since 2013
Can official Islamic institutions play a role to curb Sunni jihadi violence? Most Arab governments have granted a role to such institutions in recent years. Yet, the cases of Lebanon, Morocco and Saudi Arabia exhibit considerable differences: Sunni religious institutions in Lebanon are weak and only have a domestic role, and face difficulties fulfilling this role. The corresponding institutions in Morocco and in Saudi Arabia, however, are powerful and also perform foreign policy roles through religious diplomacy. Mainstream Muslim scholars want to be recognised as allies in the global struggle against jihadi violence; they have common interests with Western and Arab governments in combating jihadi violence. However, in the current climate of government control over official religious institutions, they lack the popular legitimacy needed to fight against violent jihadism. Religious institutions cannot be efficient when used as tools by authoritarian Arab governments. Political subjugation of religious clerics is a major reason for the fragmentation of the religious field and a driver of radicalisation.