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Sverre Lodgaard
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Sammendrag
Sverre Lodgaards ekspertområder er geopolitikk, Midtøsten, iransk utenrikspolitikk, kontroll med og nedrustning av atomvåpen og Irans og Nord-Koreas atomprogrammer.
Lodgaard var direktør for NUPI i perioden 1997–2007.
Ekspertise
Utdanning
1971 Magistergrad i statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo
Arbeidserfaring
2007- Seniorforsker, NUPI
1997-2007 Direktør, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Oslo
1992-1996 Direktør, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), FN-kontoret, Geneve
1987-1992 Direktør, Institutt for fredsforskning (PRIO), Oslo
1980-1986 Forsker, Stockholms internasjonale fredsforskningsinstitutt (SIPRI)
Aktivitet
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AUKUS og implikasjonar for Asia, forholdet mellom USA og Europa og ikkje-spreiing
Kva betyr det nye tryggingssamarbeidet mellom Australia, USA og Storbritannia - AUKUS - for tryggleik i Asia, forholdet mellom Kina og USA og forholdet mellom Europa og USA? Og kva med ikkje-spreiing?
KRONIKK: Atomparaplyen er ikke troverdig
Paraplystatene er best tjent med å bygge sitt forsvar på konvensjonelle midler, ikke på våpen som ikke kan brukes, skriver NUPI-forsker Sverre Lodgaard.
The Nuclear Umbrella Revisited
The NPT is in miserable shape, betrayed on the disarmament dimension, stuck in the Middle East and mostly irrelevant to the Asian nuclear armed states, but it has proven resilient and lingers on. It will soon be accompanied by the TPNW, which is about to enter into force. Hopefully, the wrangling between the respective treaty supporters will calm down and enable a new consensus on the normative basis for non-proliferation and disarmament consisting of a combination of both treaties. That will not happen overnight, however. There is a long way from mutual recriminations to passive co-existence to bridge-building to exploitation of synergies – if it ever happens. The dilemma facing the umbrella states is a hard one. On the one hand, it is in their interest not to be defended with nuclear weapons. On the other hand, they deem it important to remain members of NATO. These propositions may or may not be compatible. Some believe they are, emphasising that the Alliance is a conglomerate of nuclear and non-nuclear states; of states that are hosting nuclear weapons and others which do not; and that France left the military part of NATO but remained part of the political cooperation without rocking the rest. Others claim they are not and note that in the face of big power pressure, small states tend to balk at running the risks involved – especially if they cannot agree to act together. Business as usual is the problem, not the solution. In view of current trends in international security affairs there can be little disagreement about that. If so, much is achieved, because it encourages reflection and re-examination of established positions. If not, the strength of argument will remain posited against the power of inertia.
Conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula: The current state and prospects
At the end of 2017, the Korean Peninsula reached the brink of a nuclear war, as the US president Donald Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un exchanged words of nuclear threats each other. A tug of war as to whose nuclear button is bigger and stronger exacerbated the nuclear crisis. However, the South Korean President Moon Jae-in intervened to resolve the crisis by taking advantage of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. In doing so, President Moon intended to pursue denuclearisation and peace-building on the Korean Peninsula at the same time. North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un responded positively to the South Korean call to hold the inter-Korean summit and the Trump-Kim summit. In order to end the Korean war and promote peace-building on the Korean Peninsula including termination of hostile acts on inter-Korean relations, the two Koreas adopted the April 27 Panmunjom Declaration, the September 19th Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the Inter-Korean Military Agreement at their summit in 2018. The Military Agreement is aimed at reducing tension and building trust between the two Koreas through conventional arms control, while the North Korean nuclear issue is being resolved through the US-DPRK summit. The September 19th Military Agreement is a modest but remarkable success in arms control history when compared with a long-term stalemate or even retreat in the contemporary international arms control arena. Indeed, arms control is at its lowest point in history, so dim are its prospects. Nevertheless, heated debates are taking place, both at home inside South Korea and abroad, over the legitimacy and rationality of the Sept. 19th Military Agreement. With little progress on the denuclearisation issue at the Kim-Trump summit and no sign of easing economic sanctions on Pyongyang, North Korea has test-fired short-range missiles ten times to exert pressure on the United States, undermining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Against this backdrop, this policy brief intends to analyse the true meaning of the September 19 Military Agreement between the two Koreas, to identify its problems and policy implications in order to draw up supplementary measures to implement it successfully. Furthermore, the paper will draw some implications for the relationship between progress on North Korea’s denuclearisation issue and further conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula.
KRONIKK: Koronaviruset ryster internasjonal politikk
Den liberale verdensorden svekkes og verden var på vei over i noe ukjent da koronaen traff oss, skriver Sverre Lodgaard.
Det skjulte maktspelet – ubåtar i skandinavisk farvatn
Under den kalde krigen og fram til i dag har Sverige og Noreg følgt med på aktiviteten under vatn i Austersjøen og i norske fjordar. Har vi lært noko? Og veit vi eigentleg nok om denne skjulte aktiviteten?