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Sverre Lodgaard
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Sverre Lodgaards ekspertområder er geopolitikk, Midtøsten, iransk utenrikspolitikk, kontroll med og nedrustning av atomvåpen og Irans og Nord-Koreas atomprogrammer.
Lodgaard var direktør for NUPI i perioden 1997–2007.
Ekspertise
Utdanning
1971 Magistergrad i statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo
Arbeidserfaring
2007- Seniorforsker, NUPI
1997-2007 Direktør, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Oslo
1992-1996 Direktør, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), FN-kontoret, Geneve
1987-1992 Direktør, Institutt for fredsforskning (PRIO), Oslo
1980-1986 Forsker, Stockholms internasjonale fredsforskningsinstitutt (SIPRI)
Aktivitet
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Nord-Korea og USA: ein konflikt i svart og kvitt?
Saman med Asianettverket inviterer NUPI til foredrag om ‘Doomsday Clock' og trusselen om ein global atomkrig.
KRONIKK: Hvem tør stole på stormaktene?
Hvis Iran fortsatt holder seg til atomavtalen, vil EU og verden for øvrig gjøre det samme. Dermed er det USA som kan bli isolert, ikke Iran, skriver Sverre Lodgaard.
KRONIKK: Norge og atomvåpenforbudet - hva nå?
Flere land kan slutte seg til det nye forbudet mot atomvåpen. Men har Norges storting og regjering baller til det? Sverre Lodgaard skriver i Dagsavisen.
Norsk dårskap om Kina?
Var det galt av den norske regjeringen ikke å reise rettighetsfanen ved Liu Xiabos bortgang, spør Sverre Lodgaard i Dagsavisen.
Over 70 år i atomalderens tid
6 august 2015 var det 70 år siden atombomben falt over Hiroshima. Bomben la byen flat. Atomalderen var begynt.
– Støtteverdig forbud mot atomvåpen
Sverre Lodgaard har sett nærmere på muligheter og begrensninger ved de forhandlingene som nå pågår.
The vision and its implications for disarmament policy
This volume examines the conditions necessary for a stable nuclear-weapons-free world and the implications for nuclear disarmament policy. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a road map to nuclear zero, but it is a rudimentary one and it says nothing about the kind of zero to aim for. Preferably, this would be a world where the inhibitions against reversal are strong enough to make it stably non-nuclear. What then are the requirements of stable zero? The literature on nuclear disarmament has paid little attention to this question. By and large, the focus has been on the next steps, and discussions tend to stop where the NPT stops: with the elimination of the weapons. This book seeks to fill a lacuna by examining the requirements of stable zero and their implications for the road map to that goal, starting from the vision to the present day. The volume highlights that a clear conception of the goal not only is important in itself, but can shed light on what kind of disarmament process to promote. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, security studies and IR.
Introduction
This volume examines the conditions necessary for a stable nuclear-weapons-free world and the implications for nuclear disarmament policy. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a road map to nuclear zero, but it is a rudimentary one and it says nothing about the kind of zero to aim for. Preferably, this would be a world where the inhibitions against reversal are strong enough to make it stably non-nuclear. What then are the requirements of stable zero? The literature on nuclear disarmament has paid little attention to this question. By and large, the focus has been on the next steps, and discussions tend to stop where the NPT stops: with the elimination of the weapons. This book seeks to fill a lacuna by examining the requirements of stable zero and their implications for the road map to that goal, starting from the vision to the present day. The volume highlights that a clear conception of the goal not only is important in itself, but can shed light on what kind of disarmament process to promote. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, security studies and IR.