Publikasjoner
Å hoppe etter Refleks: Brendes Veivalg
I dette bidraget vil jeg løfte stortingsmeldingen "Veivalg for utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikken" frem i diskusjonen rundt Brendes arv, og i) se "Veivalg" i lys av Jonas Gahr Støres "Refleks", og ii) moderere kritikken om at det ikke ble foretatt noen veivalg i stortingsmeldingen. Jeg vil særlig trekke frem satsningen på sårbare stater, som både i meldingen og i statsbudsjettet for 2018 er viet stor plass.
Vår fiende Russland?
De siste fire årene har fiendebildet av Russland i mange land vokst seg svært sterkt, tidvis på unyansert grunnlag. Parallelt har regimet blitt vanskeligere å forsvare.
How to understand and deal with Russian strategic communication measures?
Russia’s use of communicative tools to promote the country’s strategic objectives in the aftermath of the 2014 crisis in Ukraine has posed a new strategic challenge to the Western policy-making community. NATO, the EU and national authorities have become increasingly aware of this new challenge, and have taken measures to reduce the negative impacts of Russian (dis)information campaigns.
Everyday sovereignty: International experts, brokers and local ownership in peacebuilding Liberia
The present article investigates how sovereignty is performed, enacted and constructed in an everyday setting. Based on fieldwork and interviews with international embedded experts about the elusive meaning of ‘local ownership’, we argue that while sovereignty may, indeed, be a model according to which the international community ‘constructs’ rogue or failed polities in ‘faraway’ places, this view overlooks that these places are still spaces in which contestations over spheres of authority take place every day, and thus also spaces in which sovereignty is constructed and reconstructed on a daily basis. Local ownership, then, becomes our starting point for tracing the processes of the everyday enactment of sovereignty. We make the case that sovereignty should not be reified, but instead be studied in its quotidian and dynamic production, involving the multiplicity of actors reflecting the active production of the state beyond its presumptive existence as a homogeneously organized, institutionalized and largely centralized bureaucracy.
PISM Policy Paper no. 2 (155): Gas Security in the Pipeline — Expectations and Realities
The cooperation between Norway and Poland in the energy sector has recently taken very tangible shape. In 2016, Poland decided to launch the Northern Gate project—a set of gas interconnections aiming to link the Polish gas market with gas deposits on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. With that decision, Poland wants to diversify away from Russia to mitigate energy security and political risks connected with the high level of dependence on one supplier. But in terms of Polish-Norwegian cooperation, the question of security of gas supply that Poland wants to address is accompanied by the question of the security of gas demand, a key concern for gas producers such as Norway. Hence, cooperation in the gas sector examined from those two perspectives may actually bring benefits for both countries and promises of win-win cooperation.
PISM Policy Paper nr 4 (157): Squaring the Circle: Is a Balanced Deterrence and Dialogue Approach toward Russia Workable?
Dialogue between Russia and NATO is indispensable to limit the risk of unintended military confrontation amid increased tension. Without dialogue, Alliance cohesion is also at stake. To develop a balance between deterrence and dialogue, it is necessary to understand how the two actions relate to each other, what lessons the West can learn from the past, and what goals it wants to achieve apart from limiting the risk of confrontation.
Nordic-Baltic Security in Times of Uncertainty: The Defence-Energy Nexus
The report shows that energy and defence in the Nordic-Baltic region are closely interrelated. During the Cold War, the energy cooperation of Western European countries with the USSR was seen as an element of strengthening the status quo and reducing the risk of conflict. In the new strategic situation, when Russia is interested in regaining the status of regional and global power, there is a real threat that Kremlin will use Europe's dependence on Russian gas to divide NATO and the EU. The Russian military advantage in the region, the ability to block access to Alliance forces and the ability to influence its members through energy blackmail may encourage Russia to test NATO's credibility, increasing the risk of conflict in the region. NATO's ability to deter Russia creates a natural platform of cooperation for Norway and Poland. Both states should also be interested in reducing the Alliance's dependence on Russian energy resources.
European Defence and Third Countries after Brexit
The UK’s departure from the European Union has given energy to the process towards ‘ever closer Union’ in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Many policies and initiatives have been brought to the table in the aftermath of the referendum that created shock waves in Europe. This policy brief takes stock of the developments in European defence integration since the Brexit referendum in June 2016. Contrary to the dominant political and public debate about those developments, and the political optimism inside the EU, the brief identifies some key obstacles towards expanded European defence integration. With the UK’s exit from the EU, the ‘third country’ role in the CSDP will inevitably be altered, as one of the largest military powers in Europe will stand outside of the EU. For current third countries – like Norway and Iceland – this should lead to caution regarding immediate participation and a pragmatic approach to the developments. Energy and resources should not be invested before post-Brexit institutions and practices have been established.