Nytt faktaark om klima, fred og sikkerhet i Somalia

Somalia continues to grapple with increasingly severe and frequent climate shocks that impede people’s livelihoods, worsen the existing humanitarian crisis and influence local conflict dynamics over access to natural resources. In November 2025, after four consecutive failed rainy seasons had affected millions of people, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) declared a national drought emergency. Strong El Niño conditions are forecast to bring wetter-than-usual conditions during the October–December 2026 deyr rainy season, with a high risk of floods in central and southern Somalia. Some communities experience successive periods of drought and flooding without sufficient time to recover between shocks. These adverse effects of climate change are interacting with a volatile security situation, influenced by political competition and fragmentation, as well as continued clashes with al-Shabab, which contribute to deepening an already dire humanitarian crisis.

• Climate change is undermining livelihoods in Somalia and increasing the risks of local tensions and conflict over diminishing water resources and pasture lands.
• Droughts, floods and violent conflict remain key drivers of displacement in Somalia. Internally displaced people (IDPs) are particularly vulnerable to insecurity, climate shocks and repeated displacement.
• Conflict severely limits the ability of communities to cope with and adapt to the effects of climate change. Between April 2025 and March 2026 an increase in the number of violence and security incidents was recorded, many in areas severely hit by drought.
• The severe impacts of droughts and floods place an additional strain on Somalia’s already limited state capacity to provide essential services and relief to its population.

The United Nations Security Council recognizes the adverse effects of climate change and natural disasters on Somalia’s humanitarian situation, security and stability. It has called for comprehensive risk assessments and long-term strategies to support stabilization and resilience-building. Integrating environmental and climate considerations into security and development strategies remains crucial for Somalia’s transition towards a more resilient governance structure. The FGS and Somalia’s Federal Member States (FMSs), with assistance from the UN system, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), donors and partners, should work closely to address climate-related security risks.

Recommended actions

• The UN system, donors and Somalia’s partners should continue to support the capacities of the FGS and the FMSs to anticipate, track and respond to the effects of climate change on agricultural production, both arable and livestock, and on food security and livelihoods. The FGS and FMSs also need more support for adaptation, resilience-building and the fostering of gender-sensitive climate-resilient livelihood activities.
• Addressing new and protracted displacement remains a priority in Somalia, both for immediate humanitarian needs and to build peace. To facilitate the adoption of durable solutions, actors and organizations working across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus should continue to address short-term humanitarian needs in host communities and use area-based approaches to build longer-term resilience in Somalia. Greater efforts should also be made to protect IDPs from heightened exposure to extreme weather events and insecurity.
• The UN country team, with technical support from the UN climate security and environmental adviser, should continue to support training for relevant Somali civilian and security institutions and strengthen their capacity to analyse and mitigate climate-related security risks. There is also a need for continued support to strengthen community-level conflict-monitoring systems to allow them to accurately capture where and how climate-related pressure may be contributing to or worsening conflict.
• Responses to climate change in Somalia remain reactive and reliant on emergency and humanitarian responses. There is thus a need to move from emergency response towards long-term planning and implementation for climate-resilient development. Efforts to address climate change, including climate, peace and security interventions, should also seek to strengthen state institutions at subnational and national levels, as well as build trust and cooperation between communities and the state.

Climate exposure: Trends and projections

Somalia has an arid and semi-arid climate with significant seasonal variability influenced by monsoons, tropical cyclones, and its coastlines on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Historically, it has two rainy seasons: gu in March–June and deyr in October–December.

Temperature trends in Somalia indicate a warming trend, increasing at a rate of 0.16°C per decade since 1970.¹ Mean annual temperature for Somalia is estimated at 26.8°C. Conservative projections (SSP1-2.6) estimate that the mean annual temperature will reach 27.9°C by 2039.² Under the high-emission scenario (SSP5-8.5), it is expected to reach 28.1°C by the same year.

Rainfall in Somalia is characterized by interannual and seasonal variability. Conditions are hot and arid in the north (with up to 50 millimetres of rainfall) and wetter in the south (c. 400 mm) and south-west (c. 600 mm).³ Precipitation trends show an overall decline in annual rainfall of about 2 mm per decade.⁴ By 2039, average annual precipitation in Somalia is projected to be between 361.4 mm (under SSP1-2.6) and 360.7 mm (SSP5-8.5).⁵

Following the severe drought conditions in 2021–23, Somalia continued to experience consecutive failed rainy seasons during 2024 (deyr) and 2025 (both gu and deyr).⁶ In 2025 Somalia’s annual precipitation was estimated at 153.2 mm, the second lowest since 1970.⁷ Erratic and poor rainfall continued during the 2026 gu season and provided only limited relief to the drought conditions. El Niño conditions and an anticipated positive Indian Ocean Dipole are expected to bring higher than average rainfall in the deyr rainy season of October–December 2026.⁸ These conditions will increase the risk of severe flooding (riverine and flash floods) in central and southern Somalia, along the Juba and Shabelle river corridors.⁹

Socioecological vulnerabilities

Somalia ranks among the world’s poorest countries and faces several interconnected challenges that exacerbate its vulnerability. Political instability, weak institutions, protracted conflict and exposure to the effects of climate change continue to impede the country’s growth, food security and poverty reduction.¹⁰ A large part of the population is dependent on agriculture and livestock production, which is continuously affected by rising temperatures, droughts, water scarcity and, in some areas, flooding.

Recurring droughts and floods, as well as ongoing poor security, continue to cause displacement and food insecurity and to contribute to a complex humanitarian crisis.¹¹ As of April 2026 more than 5 million people were affected by severe drought conditions, including crop and livestock losses, water shortages, and displacement.¹² Drought conditions combined with the risk of severe flooding in late 2026 threaten to perpetuate a pattern in which communities shift between drought and flood conditions without sufficient time to recover between shocks.¹³

Violence from inter-clan conflicts, attacks by al-Shabab (a transnational Islamist armed group) and military offensives against non-state armed groups continue to displace people and reduce the capacity of individuals and households to cope with the adverse effects of climate change.

Somalia is highly dependent on humanitarian assistance, which has dwindled owing to funding cuts, leaving many drought-affected areas with limited response capacity.¹⁴ Of the total humanitarian funding requirement for 2026 (US$852 million), only 30.5 per cent had been received as of 31 August 2026.¹⁵

The situation in Somalia is further exacerbated by rising prices for fuel, food and commodities linked to disrupted supply chains partly as a result of ongoing hostilities in the Middle East. Somalia relies heavily on imports, and so disrupted supply chains and increased commodity prices risk placing already struggling households under further pressure.¹⁶

Climate-related peace and security risks

Climate change is rarely the main driver of conflict, but it can undermine development gains, exacerbate the dynamics of ongoing violence, amplify existing tensions and disrupt fragile peace processes. Violent conflict and political instability can also weaken community resilience to the effects of climate change. This fact sheet uses four interrelated pathways to navigate the relationship between climate change, peace and security: (a) livelihood impacts, (b) migration and mobility, (c) armed actors and security, and (d) political and economic grievances.¹⁷

Livelihood impacts

Climate pressures on livelihoods are becoming more severe in Somalia. Consecutive failed rainy seasons and severe drought conditions continue to affect the agriculture sector, food security and livelihoods. Drought cycles are reportedly becoming longer and more intense, reducing water availability, degrading pasturelands, and lowering crop and livestock productivity.¹⁸ Flooding disrupts livelihoods and infrastructure. In some cases, these climate-related impacts have undermined critical rural livestock economies and agropastoral incomes and increased the risk of local conflict over natural resource.¹⁹

Climate-related shocks intensify competition over diminishing water resources and pasture lands, and influence local tensions and conflict dynamics, including disputes or competing clan claims over access to natural resources. In the Shabelle River Basin, for example, tensions between pastoralist and arable farming communities often escalate into violence during times of drought when herders move their livestock into farmlands in search of grazing areas.²⁰

Reduced household incomes, loss of productive assets and food insecurity increase the need for and dependence on humanitarian assistance. In July–September 2026 an estimated 5.1 million people in Somalia faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above).²¹ The total number of food-insecure people had increased from 3.4 million recorded between July and September 2025 owing to worsening drought conditions, rising food prices and insecurity across parts of Somalia.²² For example, the failure of the deyr rainy season of October–December 2025 led to failed crop harvests and depletion of water and pasture areas. Crop production declined sharply, and livestock deaths due to starvation and diseases reduced household incomes in 2026.²³

Moreover, conflict has undermined people’s resilience to shocks by disrupting agriculture and markets and restricting access to water and pasture and to humanitarian assistance. Livelihood shocks affect women and men differently in Somalia. Women have limited rights to land ownership and remain under-represented in formal and informal governance, and they are disproportionately affected by climate shocks.²⁴ Climate-related livelihood losses can intensify household stress. Where harmful gender norms and weak protection systems already exist, this may increase risks of gender-based violence, including intimate-partner violence.²⁵

More support by donors, the UN system and Somalia’s partners is needed for resilience-building and to foster gender-sensitive, climate-resilient livelihood activities, including diversification and strengthening of agropastoral systems against climate shocks.

Migration and mobility

Climate change-related disasters and insecurity continue to drive forced and voluntary migration, including displacement in Somalia. For example, drought-induced displacement accounted for the majority of new displacements during the first quarter of 2026 following the failure of the 2025 deyrrainy season.²⁶

IDPs in Somalia face several risks, including repeated displacement and heightened insecurity. Weak service provision and safety nets mean that IDPs are especially vulnerable and at risk of adopting negative coping strategies in the short term. As of June 2026, Somalia hosted 3.3 million IDPs.²⁷ Droughts, floods and conflict also drive movement from rural to urban and peri-urban areas, mainly Mogadishu and Baidoa, contributing to high urbanization.²⁸ The unplanned settlement in urban and peri-urban areas to which this movement partly contributes is often vulnerable to impacts of climate change, such as flooding.²⁹ In Mogadishu, forced evictions contribute to repeated displacement and deepen the exposure of IDPs to insecurity and climate shocks.

Climate-related migration and mobility in Somalia can accentuate local tensions, including conflicts over livestock. This has been observed in areas such as Galmudug state’s Abudwaaq district, where nomadic pastoralists use seasonal migration to cope with adverse weather conditions.³⁰ Following the failed 2025 deyr rains, pastoralists were forced to move their livestock earlier and farther than usual, leading to increased concentration of animals along migration routes.³¹ Such movements outside established traditional seasonal migration patterns can create risks of tensions and clashes over competing access to grazing land and water points between pastoralists and farming communities.³²

Most climate-related migration takes place within Somalia’s borders, but drought conditions increase cross-border migration too, for example, from Ethiopia’s Somali region, and even long-distance migration to the Gulf states via Yemen.³³ In addition to seasonal migration, economic reasons linked to limited livelihood and income-generating options were among the primary drivers for voluntary movement in 2025. Disasters were the leading cause of forced movement, followed by conflict-related movements, which slightly increased compared to 2024.³⁴

Addressing new and protracted displacement remains a priority in Somalia for humanitarian and peacebuilding purposes. More efforts should be devoted to protecting IDPs from heightened risks to extreme weather events and insecurity.

Armed actors and security

The security situation in Somalia remains fragile and complex, driven by continued armed group activities, clan-based disputes and political fragmentation. An increase in the level of violence and security incidents resulted in an estimated 8753 fatalities between April 2025 and March 2026.³⁵ Violence and security incidents were concentrated in areas that were among the worst hit by droughts (e.g. Lower Shabelle, Lower Juba, Galguduud, Madug, Middle Shabelle, Bay and Hiran regions).³⁶ Clan-related conflicts involving clashes over competing land and water resources were reported in Gedo, Bakol and Lower Shabelle regions during the same period.³⁷

Research also shows that armed groups can adapt their strategies and tactics to capitalize on local grievances and the impacts of climate change. This can be through recruitment efforts that exploit climate-related livelihood stress or the opportunistic use of disasters to advance control over communities.³⁸ For example, during Somalia’s 2021–23 drought, al-Shabab challenged government relief efforts by setting fire to food trucks and destroying water wells and part of the Shabelle riverbank.³⁹ Al-Shabab continues to assert itself as a provider of security and services in rural areas where state presence is limited.⁴⁰ The group shapes climate adaptation and environmental governance and enforces regulations on tree-cutting, access to water and grazing land. Governance and control over such resources increase the group’s revenue and advance its political and military objectives.⁴¹

Violent conflict severely limits the ability of communities to cope and adapt to the effects of climate change. In August 2026 al-Shabab seized Teedan town in Hiran region, a strategic rural area that is currently grappling with the effects of drought and high food insecurity.⁴² The fighting and subsequent occupation risk limiting humanitarian access and causing further displacement. In Lower Shabelle, renewed conflicts related to resource disputes and ongoing fighting between the Somali government and al-Shabab have displaced farming households, with some arriving in IDP camps in Mogadishu where they face severe humanitarian conditions.⁴³

UN Security Council Resolution 2809 of 2025 recognizes the adverse effects of climate change and natural disasters on Somalia’s security and stability. It stresses the need for long-term strategies, based on comprehensive risk assessments by the FGS and the United Nations, to support stabilization and build resilience.⁴⁴ The UN country team and the UN climate security and environmental adviser should continue to support the training and capacity-building of Somali security forces and civilian actors to analyse and mitigate climate-related security risks. There is also a need for continued support to strengthen community-level conflict-monitoring systems so that they can accurately capture where and how climate-related pressure may be contributing to or worsening conflict.

Political and economic grievances

Despite gains made towards peacebuilding and state-building, the political situation in Somalia remains precarious, with weak institutions, fragmentation between the FGS and the FMSs, and contestation over political power and constitutional reforms.⁴⁵ Disputes over constitutional reform, the electoral model and federal mandates, alongside Puntland’s and Jubaland’s suspensions of cooperation with the FGS, have further weakened federal–state coordination. This fragmentation may constrain effective planning, coordination and implementation of climate, peace and security interventions.

The adverse effects of climate change place additional strain on Somalia’s state-building and peacebuilding by undermining economic gains and state authority.⁴⁶ For example, climate-related disasters, if not effectively addressed, can erode public confidence in state institutions and fuel widespread discontent, especially when these institutions do not effectively deliver critical services such as water, food, shelter and sanitation in times of need. Limited state presence in areas hit hardest by climate-related disasters (e.g. rural parts of southern and central Somalia) leaves many communities reliant on humanitarian assistance and informal networks or non-state actors for support.⁴⁷

Climate change can thus exacerbate vulnerabilities and grievances and can create opportunities for elites and powerful groups to control and position themselves as protectors of access to resources for certain groups at the expense of others. This contributes to clan-based disputes and conflicts over land and water, which further undermine state governance and legitimacy.⁴⁸ Land and water-related disputes and conflicts cannot be addressed without trusted systems for managing these resources and resolving related disputes.

The FGS has made considerable effort over the years to recognize and institutionalize climate, peace and security, including efforts underway to develop a national strategy on the subject.⁴⁹ However, there is still a general lack of coordination among the different efforts at various levels: between relevant line ministries at national level, between national and subnational authorities, and between humanitarian, development and security actors working in Somalia.⁵⁰ Responses to climate change remain reactive and reliant on emergency and humanitarian responses.⁵¹ There is thus a need to move from emergency response towards long-term planning and implementation for climate-resilient development in Somalia. Efforts to address climate change, including climate, peace and security interventions, should seek to strengthen relations and trust-building between communities and the state and to strengthen state institutions and coordination at subnational and national levels.

Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheets are a joint product by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), with funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. The information in this fact sheet does not necessarily reflect the views of these partners.

The Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheets aim to generate reliable, relevant, timely and actionable information and analysis on climate-related peace and security risks in selected countries and regions on the United Nations Security Council agenda.

Endnotes

1. World Bank, Climate Change Knowledge Portal, ‘Somalia’, accessed 4 Aug. 2026.
2. World Bank (note 1), ‘Future climates’.
3. World Bank (note 1), ‘Historical climate’.
4. World Bank (note 1).
5. World Bank (note 1), ‘Future climates’.
6. Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), ‘Intensifying Somalia drought likely to be as severe as previous prolonged dry periods, FAO warns’, 28 Jan. 2026; and Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), Somali Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM), Drought Monitoring Tool for Somalia, ‘Combined Drought Index (CDI)’, accessed 4 Aug. 2026.
7. World Bank (note 1), ‘Historical climate’.
8. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), Technical statement from the 74th Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum (GHACOF74), Aug. 2026.
9. World Food Programme (WFP), ‘Somalia El Niño 2026: Flood exposure & preparedness analysis deyr season, October–December 2026’, Aug. 2026: and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (note 8).
10. World Bank, Somalia: Country Climate and Development Report (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2026).
11. World Bank (note 10).
12. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Somalia: 2025–2026 drought emergency’, Situation Report no. 5, 6 Apr. 2026.
13. Author interview with UN agency in Somalia no. 1, Aug. 2026; and Author interview with UN agency in Somalia no. 3, Aug. 2026. The research for this fact sheet was complemented by interviews with 5 experts working on climate, peace and security and environmental peacebuilding in Somalia in Aug. 2026: 2 individual semi-structured interviews with experts from the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and 1 semi-structured group interview involving 3 participants from the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
14. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Somalia Monthly Humanitarian Update, July 2026.
15. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Somalia: 2026 humanitarian funding overview’, 31 Aug. 2026.
16. Ali, F., ‘Gulf war fallout: Somali households pay the price of trade disruption’, New Humanitarian, 17 Aug. 2026; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (note 12); and van Rooyen, M., ‘How the Iran war could derail Somalia’s fragile recovery’, Institute of Security Studies (ISS), ISS Today, 14 May 2026.
17. Mobjörk, M., Krampe, F. and Tarif, K., ‘Pathways of climate insecurity: Guidance for policymakers’, SIPRI Policy Brief, Nov. 2020.
18. Author interviews nos 1–3 (note 13).
19. World Bank (note 10); and Somali Ministry of National Resources, ‘National Adaptation Programme of Action on Climate Change (NAPA)’, Apr. 2013; and Maystadt, J. F. and Ecker, O., ‘Extreme weather and civil war: Does drought fuel conflict in Somalia through livestock price shocks?’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 96, no. 4 (2014).
20. World Bank (note 10).
21. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), ‘Somalia: Acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition analysis July–December 2026’, 23 Sep. 2026.
22. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), ‘Somalia: Acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition analysis July–December 2025’, 23 Sep. 2025; and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (note 21).
23. Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), ‘Somalia’, Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) Country Briefs, Mar. 2026.
24. Hassan, A. ‘Somalia’s women and girls are victims of climate change’, Inkstick, 11 May 2023; and Syn, J., Housing, Land and Property Rights for Somalia’s Urban Displaced Women(Norwegian Refugee Council: Oslo, 2016).
25. Author interview no. 3 (note 13).
26. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), ‘Somalia emergency trend tracking’, Quarterly Overview Q1 2026.
27. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Somalia refugees and internal displaced people’, June 2026.
28. Boru Halakhe, A. and Miller, S., ‘No going back: The new urban face of internal displacement in Somalia’, Refugees International, 25 May 2023.
29. World Bank (note 10).
30. International Organization for Migration (IOM) Somalia, ‘Galmudug district profiling’, Analysis brief, Sep. 2023.
31. Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (note 23).
32. Author interview no. 1 (note 13).
33. ‘Rise in migrants from Horn of Africa to Gulf states worrying: UN’, Al Jazeera, 15 Feb. 2023; and Radio Ergo, ‘IDP camps in Abudwak, Galgadud, swell with families from Ethiopia’, 20 Feb. 2023.
34. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), ‘Somalia flow monitoring’, Annual Overview 2025.
35. European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Somalia: Security Situation, Country of Origin Information Report (EUAA: Valletta, May 2026).
36. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), ‘Somalia: Acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition analysis January–June 2026’, 24 Feb. 2026; and European Union Agency for Asylum (note 35).
37. European Union Agency for Asylum (note 35).
38. Mobjörk et al. (note 17); and van Baalen, S. and Mobjörk, M., ‘Climate change and violent conflict in East Africa: Integrating qualitative and quantitative research to probe the mechanisms’, International Studies Review, vol. 20, no. 4 (Dec. 2018).
39. Radio Ergo, ‘Hiran families return to burnt village to try to restart their lives’, 25 Nov. 2022; Radio Ergo, ‘Weekly feedback report: 15–21 September 2022’, 23 Sep. 2022; International Crisis Group, ‘Sustaining gains in Somalia’s offensive against Al-Shabaab’, Africa Briefing no. 187, 21 Mar. 2023; and Dahir, A. L., ‘Militants attack trucks carrying food relief in Somalia’, New York Times, 3 Sep. 2022.
40. European Union Agency for Asylum (note 35).
41. Jackson, A. et al., ‘How Al-Shabaab shapes climate adaptation in Somalia’, Centre on Armed Groups, Sep. 2026.
42. International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Aug. 2026; and Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), ‘Risk of famine persists in and around Bay region after erratic May rains’, Update May–Sep. 2026.
43. Onkod Radio, ‘Conflict drives farmers into Somalia’s capital Mogadishu’, Horn Observer, 17 Aug. 2026.
44. UN Security Council Resolution 2809, 23 Dec. 2025.
45. European Union Agency for Asylum (note 35); World Bank (note 10); and Author interview no. 1 (note 13).
46. World Bank (note 10).
47. World Bank (note 10).
48. World Bank (note 10).
49. Author interview no. 3 (note 13).
50. Author interview nos 1–3 (note 13).
51. Author interview nos 1–3 (note 13).