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Lars Gjesvik
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Lars Gjesvik er seniorforsker i Forskningsgruppen for sikkerhet og forsvar, og medleder for NUPIs forskningssenter for ny teknologi.
Han forsker på samspillet mellom teknologi, handel og makt i internasjonal politikk. Det omfatter tematikker som cybersikkerhet, det ytre rom, digital suverenitet og teknologiavhengighet, økonomisk sikkerhet og derisking, global styring av digitale teknologier, maktkonsentrasjon hos digitale selskaper og beskyttelse av kritisk digital infrastruktur som undersjøiske kabler. Tidligere arbeid har adressert nasjonale tilnærminger og offentlig-privat samarbeid innenfor cybersikkerhet, og desinformasjon og påvirkningskampanjer.
Hans doktorgrad fra Universitet i Oslo (2023) ser på samspillet mellom private selskaper og statlige interesser i det digitale rom, og rollen teknologiselskaper spiller i å sette rammene for internasjonal politikk.
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NUPIpodden #9: Cybersikkerhet: Bør du bekymre deg?
I denne ferske episoden av NUPIpodden forklarer NUPI-forsker Lars Gjesvik om hva cybersikkerhet faktisk dreier seg om, hvem som kan stå bak cybera...
NUPIpodden #13: Trusselen fra teknologien – slik kan demokratiet hackes
Hvor lett er det egentlig å hacke demokratier? Hva kan hackerne faktisk gjøre? Og hvor sannsynlig er det at noen prøver å hacke norske valg? I epi...
Annex to the report 'Norway’s strategic dependencies in global supply chain networks'
This annex is connected to the NUPI Report 'Norway’s strategic dependencies in global supply chain networks' found here: https://www.nupi.no/en/publications/cristin-pub/norway-s-strategic-dependencies-in-global-supply-chain-networks
Norway’s strategic dependencies in global supply chain networks
Economic interdependence and global supply chains are being investigated anew. For a long time, a belief in the ability of growing economic ties to foster cooperation, dampen conflict, and enhance prosperity was predominant in academic and political thinking alike. However, these assumptions have recently proven to be half-truths at best. Rather than dampen conflict, the asymmetries of global supply chains have turned them into coercive tools for the powerful to wield against the powerless. Through sanctions and export controls, states controlling vital chokepoints in global economic networks can cause harm in targeted states, and through controlling the nodes of information highways, intelligence agencies can gain access to sensitive information by leveraging the key position of their domestic companies. For states with small, open economies, this development poses a thorny problem: the toolbox for realigning global supply chains is limited, but reliance on supply chains beyond national control is extensive. The problem is not limited to being in a position of dependence, however. For smaller states, being in control over global assets, or being a key provider of a product or resource others depend on can be a double-edged sword. As economic coercion becomes more widely deployed, the impetus for protecting and securing assets increases, and the risk that they might drag smaller states into geopolitical contests grows. Addressing these concerns, it is vital to develop tools, frameworks, and methodologies for assessing supply chains from a national perspective, with a focus on how economic interdependence might introduce geopolitical risks. Against this background, this report builds on recent theoretical and methodological developments for analyzing global supply chains in light of their potential for geopolitical weaponization. More precisely, it will study Norway’s position in global value chains by combining recent methodological developments on the network analysis of supply chains and recent analysis of country-level aggregated analysis of supply dependencies. This allows for a study of supply chains as networks of economic relations, in which the position of different national economies contains both strategic capacities, or assets, by being central suppliers on which other countries depend, and vulnerabilities, by depending heavily on other countries. The report thus uses network analysis to identify Norway’s positions and their related strategic vulnerabilities and assets. Link to the Annex for this report: https://www.nupi.no/publications/cristin-pub/annex-to-the-report-norway-s-strategic-dependencies-in-global-supply-chain-networks
Hacker telefonen din fra tusenvis av mil unna – uten at du merker det
Teknologi som kan overvåke telefonen din kan forhindre terrorisme og kriminalitet. Men hva skjer når teknologien som i utgangspunktet skulle bidra...
A more strategic European Union in a more contested space
Space is becoming an increasingly important domain for societies and politics alike, also from a geopolitical and hence security and defence perspective. The EU is a key actor in space, but its approach to space is changing in a more uncertain and contested geopolitical environment. While still focused largely on the civilian aspects of space, the EU has developed a more strategic approach towards space, increasingly using the domain also for security and defence, including military, purposes. As the EU develops quickly in a more challenging and uncertain environment, Norway needs to understand EU developments and their implications at an early stage, and work to secure participation where interests align.
Digital Supply Chain Dependency and Resilience
Mens en voksende mengde litteratur tar for seg hvordan stater i økende grad søker å sikre sine digitale områder og begrense avhengigheter, har det blitt viet mindre oppmerksomhet til hvordan digital infrastruktur påvirker deres evne til å gjøre dette. Denne artikkelen presenterer en ny tilnærming til å studere cybersikkerhet og digitale avhengigheter, med fokus på hvordan private selskaper påvirker staters evne til å sikre kritiske tjenester. I denne artikkelen analyserer vi digitale forsyningskjeder for å undersøke de tekniske tverrgående tjenestene, infrastrukturene og lokasjonene som populære mobilapplikasjoner er avhengige av. Vi argumenterer for at disse avhengighetene har ulike effekter på motstandskraften til digitale teknologier på nasjonalt nivå, men at det å håndtere disse avhengighetene krever ulike og til tider motstridende tiltak. For å studere dette fenomenet utvikler vi en metodikk for å utforske dette empirisk ved å spore og undersøke de spredte og ofte implisitte avhengighetene i populære mobilapplikasjoner. For å analysere disse avhengighetene registrerer vi rå datatrafikkstrømmer for så å geolokalisere de ulike avhengighetene til utvalgte applikasjoner sett fra Oslo, Barcelona, Paris, Zagreb, Mexico By og Dublin.
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Internet governance and the UN in a multiplex world order era?
Over the last two decades Internet Governance (IG) has emerged as an increasingly complex and fraught field of policymaking involving both states and non-state actors on a multitude of arenas. Facing this complex field, the role of the United Nations (UN) in IG has been both varying and contested. While the UN has been discussing issues related to IG since the 1990s, disagreements on both substantive issues and where discussions ought to take place have intermittently resurfaced and remained relevant, but recent processes and challenges to the status quo asks questions about the direction going forward. In the UN, recently established processes aims to revamp the approach to IG, while the negotiations over a cybercrime convention, and the 2022 ITU plenipotentiary have made the long running contests between western and authoritarian states over this topic more visible. Broader trends and rising tensions globally raises questions not only about the future for the global nature of IG and the role of the UN in this, but also whether decoupling and alliances with like-minded states might become more dominant than global multilateral and multi-stakeholder channels, i.e a trend pointing towards a multiplex field of internet governance.1