Publikasjoner
Rapport fra Respons-prosjektets åpningskonferanse, Oslo, 21. mars 2023
Åpningskonferansen for Utenriksdepartementets Respons-prosjekt fant sted på Sentralen i Oslo 21. mars 2023. Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI) var arrangør, og arrangementet var derfor organisert innenfor rammen av NUPIs årlige utenrikspolitiske konferanse. Tittel for konferansen var “Norsk utenrikspolitisk konferanse 2023: Respons – norsk utenrikspolitikk for en ny tid”. Programmet besto av seks sekvenser, med til sammen 28 innledere og ordstyrere på scenen. Åpningssekvensen risset opp det overordnede bildet, etterfulgt av egne bolker om sikkerhetspolitikk, utviklingen i nord-sør dynamikken og forholdet mellom Kina og Vesten. Konferansens to siste sekvenser tok for seg norsk utenrikspolitikk i møte med en internasjonal kontekst i rask endring. Statsminister Jonas Gahr Støre (Ap) holdt åpningstalen i den første bolken, mens utenriksminister Anniken Huitfeldt (Ap) deltok i panelsamtale i den siste bolken. Mesteparten av programmet foregikk på norsk, men enkelte innlegg og utvekslinger ble holdt på engelsk. Under følger en oppsummering av noen hovedtema og problemstillinger som ble drøftet i hver bolk.
Blog Post | The EU as a diplomatic actor in space
Space diplomacy, defined as ‘processed of dialogue that result in outcomes of cooperation or conflict on a given space issue’, has shielded space from great power conflicts playing out elsewhere – both during the Cold War and in the decades that followed.
Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Jemen
Yemen is facing one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world due to a combination of prolonged conflict, economic crisis and recurrent climate change-related natural hazards. These hazards include temperature increases, rising sea levels and changing patterns in rainfall, causing floods, droughts, reduced water availability and soil degradation. Climate change exacerbates vulnerabilities, threatens livelihoods and influences existing conflicts.
How Do Ad-Hoc Security Initiatives Fit in Africa’s Evolving Security Landscape?
Over the last two decades, places like the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Somalia, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Northern Mozambique have experienced a rise (and in some cases, a resurgence) of groups that use violence to challenge the state. Often termed “rebel groups,” some, like the M23 in eastern DRC, fit the rebel model. But many others take the form of violent extremist insurgencies that mix insurgent tactics with criminal activities, such as banditry and the illicit trading of goods, drugs, money, and natural resources. What both have in common is the use of violence to pursue political and economic objectives related to long-standing center-periphery grievances, and economic and political marginalization.
Analysis: The military's ambitions dash Sudan's hopes for democracy... Who is to blame, and will the conflict end?
Opinions are divided about who is to blame for the current conflict in Sudan. Is it Al-Bashir for his reliance on armed groups? Or is it the civilian-military structure of the former Sudanese government that concentrated power in the hands of the military? Mother of the West, who failed to impose sanctions on Al-Burhan and Hamidti when they staged a coup against the civilian government in October 2021.
African-Led Peace Support Operations in a declining period of new UN Peacekeeping Operations
The United Nations is known to be the preeminent body to authorize and oversee international peacekeeping missions; however, new forms of African-led Peace Sup- port Operations (PSOs) are increasingly common, innovative, and context-specific. This paper examines the evolution of African-led PSOs and argues that African-led PSOs are filling a vacuum and taking on responsibilities once assumed by the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO). The paper posits that the rise of African- led PSOs is due to the growing need for security and respond to the changing nature of conflict, the spread of insecurity and terrorism, and cross-border violence. Finally, the paper explores the implications of these operations for future missions in Africa, arguing that the future of African-led PSOs may be the preferred choice, with Regional Economic Communities and Ad-hoc Security Initiatives leading the way.
African-Led Peace Support Operations in a declining period of new UN Peacekeeping Operations
FN er kjent som den fremste institusjonen for å autorisere og overvåke internasjonale fredsbevarende operasjoner. Samtidig blir nye former for afrikanskledede fredsstøtteoperasjoner (PSOer) stadig vanligere, mer innovative og bedre tilpasset lokale kontekster. Denne artikkelen undersøker utviklingen av afrikanskledede PSOer og argumenterer for at disse operasjonene fyller et tomrom ved å påta seg oppgaver som tidligere ble ivaretatt av FNs fredsbevarende operasjoner (UN PKO). Artikkelen hevder at fremveksten av afrikanskledede PSOer skyldes et økende behov for sikkerhet og en respons på konfliktbildets endrede karakter, spredningen av usikkerhet og terrorisme, samt grenseoverskridende vold. Avslutningsvis drøfter artikkelen implikasjonene av disse operasjonene for fremtidige oppdrag i Afrika, og argumenterer for at afrikanskledede PSOer kan bli det foretrukne alternativet, med regionale økonomiske fellesskap og ad hoc-sikkerhetsinitiativer i en ledende rolle.
Nomads and Warlords, Chadian Forces in African Peace Operations
Despite criticism of the United Nations (UN) as peacekeepers “hiding behind sandbags,” by the former president of Chad, the Chadian military has become a critical enabler of African-led and UN peace operations. This paper posits that the effectiveness of the Chadian forces stems from refined and modified nomad and warlord structures and attributes used during Chad’s various conflicts to build and improve its national army. This has allowed the Chadian regime to exercise and project power, thus, producing one of Africa’s most effective forces for current conflicts and challenges. Thus, Chad’s military leadership reflects a trend of states that use military prowess to project force, while maintaining international partnerships with permanent members of the unsc (the US and France), UN peacekeeping missions and African ad hoc security initiatives. Finally, the paper examines the implications of this trend for the evolving nature of African Peace and Security Architecture.
Transferring Policy: The African Union’s Protection of Civilians Policy in Peacekeeping Missions in Somalia and South Sudan
The African Union’s (AU’s) doctrine underlying Peace Support Operations (PSOs) highlights the fact that the AU should take the lead in providing political direction for all AU PSOs. This includes mainstreaming the standards and operating procedures applicable to the Protection of Civilians (PoC). The PoC guidelines mandate the AU to support and complement the efforts of the host state by enhancing its capacity to secure civilians and prevent abuse against them. The guidelines have allowed the AU to develop and grow its institutional capacity and emerge as the continent’s leading institution. It provides fragile member states with technical support through African-led and AU-mandated missions (crafting the concept of operations, training and implementation and procedures for peace operations). However, little is known about how the AU transfers its PoC policy to member states during peacekeeping missions. This paper assesses the institutional capacity of the AU and its ability to influence specific national PoC policies and approaches through AU PSO and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKOs). The paper highlights that although the AU has made progress in PoC policy, it has not been implemented effectively and practically in South Sudan and Somalia, despite being a significant priority for the organisation.
Why carbon border adjustment mechanisms will not save the planet but a climate club and subsidies for transformative green technologies may
We find that both empirical results and economic theory show that carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) will be ineffective at meeting global goals for carbon emissions reduction; but CBAMs will be effective at improving the competitiveness of the domestic industries by assuring that imports bear equal costs of carbon pricing. We elaborate two complementary proposals that hold greater promise for meeting climate goals: (i) a Climate Club, where member countries impose a minimum price for carbon emissions at home and a tariff surcharge on all imports from non-member countries; and (ii) a 0.2%-of-GDP subsidy by high-income countries for transformative research designed to make green energy cheaper than fossil fuels. We discuss multiple paths for a Climate Club to be accommodated within the rules of the World Trade Organization and recommend use of the exception clause under GATT Article XX.