Åsmund Weltzien
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Åsmund Weltzien er kommunikasjonssjef på NUPI. Han har hovedfag i sosialantropologi fra Universitetet i Oslo, og har tidligere jobbet som forsker og forskningsleder i Telenor R&D og som diplomat og saksbehandler i Utenriksdepartementet.
Weltzien jobber for å fremme NUPIs forskning til et bredt publikum og til brukerne av forskningen vår. Han er spesielt opptatt av å bidra til at NUPIs forskere skaper sosial og vitenskapelig impact, å forbedre vår digitale kommunikasjon gjennom utvikling og eksperimentering, og å bygge nettverk blant fagpersoner, brukere og interessenter der kunnskap og innsikt deles på tvers av institusjoner og sektorer.
I Telenor var Weltziens egen forskning fokusert på utviklingen av nye digitale teknologier og hvordan informasjon og påvirkning spres i sosiale nettverk. I Utenriksdepartementet har han jobbet med ulike felt som norsk klimapolitikk, sikkerhetspolitikk, og europapolitikk. Fra 2011 var Weltzien en del av UDs Refleksprosjekt, som skulle bidra til utvikling av utenrikspolitikken gjennom offentlig debatt om sentrale utenrikspolitiske temaer.
Weltzien har vært kommunikasjonssjef på NUPI siden 2013.
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Tøm alle filtreUruguay's beef industry : an assessment of WTO disciplines on market access in agriculture / José Bervejillo
Tariff Rate Quotas – Free Trade or Non-Tariff Barriers? The Case of Norwegian Seafood Exports to the EU
France and the European Union: a story of reason rather than love
In France, the push for the European integration process has come historically for a large part from the political and administrative elite. Over the past 60 years, they have expressed not only interest but also belief in European integration, as the US scholar Craig Parsons has rightly noted. Three beliefs about the EU have been recurrent fundamentals for French political and administrative elites: 1. The EU must have a ‘core’ consisting in the major member states which exercise a leadership on the rest. In this regard, France and Germany must share the role of motor or driving force. 2. The EU must not be limited to a single market. It should develop as a political project including a foreign and security policy. This is usually called in France l’Europe puissance, a term difficult to translate. 3. The EU governance should be a combination of supranational and intergovernmental institutions
Security Sector Reform: A Literature Review
‘Security sector reform’, or SSR, has become a cornerstone of international development, post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building initiatives. The term emerged in the late 1990s in recognition of the changing international security environment and the limitations of peace accords in failing and failed states. Aimed at promoting both effective and legitimate provision of security in countries emerging from conflict or undergoing processes of political transition, SSRrelated activities have growth significantly in scope as well as scale. However, security sector reform remains a contested concept that can have different meanings in different contexts and for different audiences. Various institutions, groups and nations involved in SSR tend to understand the concept on the basis of their own policies, doctrines and practices.1 Experience has also shown that SSR is often conducted in challenging political, socio-economic and security environments. Given the diversity of perceptions and contexts, SSR approaches and implementation vary greatly within the international community. Against that backdrop, this contribution reviews the comprehensive literature on security sector reform. Specifically, it asks: what were the authoritative influences and actors in the development of the SSR concept? What is the current state of theoretical discussion? What challenges and opportunities does adoption of SSR entail? How successfully has the concept been adopted in international peace operations? Are there any particular criticisms of the SSR concept? How might SSR practice be improved?
Russia and China in Central Asia
Over the last three years, Russia and China have increased their engagement in Central Asia in response to NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Moscow has deepened its security cooperation with the Central Asian states with a new strategic purpose– guarding against instability spilling over from northern Afghanistan– and has promoted the expansion of the Eurasian Economic Union. China also has dramatically accelerated its economic activities in the region by announcing the One Belt One Route (OBOR) initiative, an ambitious project to upgrade regional infrastructure and connect China to Europe and the Middle East. Although both Beijing and Moscow claim to be regional partners and not rivals, since the Ukraine crisis Russia has been forced to accept China’s terms of cooperation in order to signal that it has non-Western partners and opportunities.