Hva skjer med den russiske krigsmotstanden?
På dette frokostseminaret ser vi nærmere på hvilken motstand russerne har mot krigen i Ukraina.
Opportunities Matter: The Evolution of Far-Right Protest in Georgia
What role do political opportunities play in far-right mobilisation? The case of Georgia indicates that modernisation in itself may be insufficient to trigger a far-right backlash. A systematised database of 154 far-right protest events in Georgia in the period 2003–2020 shows that the movement remained dormant for over two decades after post-Soviet independence and a decade after the 2003 Rose Revolution. After 2012, however, less severe repression of protest, divides within the political elite, and the sympathetic attitudes of mainstream political and societal actors enabled far-right mobilisation and violence. Thus, however deep-rooted anti-modernisation, a backlash may not erupt until mobilisation opportunities become available.
Noen har hevdet at mitt moralske kompass er gått i stykker
Jeg forsøker å skjønne hvorfor Kreml handler som det gjør. Er det virkelig det samme som å støtte disse handlingene?
Tale ved utdeling av Fritt Ords Pris 2023
Torsdag 11. mai 2023 fikk NUPI-forsker Julie Wilhelmsen Fritt Ords Pris 2023 for å ha bidratt med nyanserende faglig kunnskap i et opphetet offentlig ordskifte, før og etter Russlands fullskala-invasjon av Ukraina. Hun har gjennom dette vist betydningen av ytringsmot og utøvd akademisk ytringsfrihet i praksis, sa styreleder Grete Brochmann.
Kronikk: Enkle merkelapper fanger ikke opp Putins Russland
NUPI på Arendalsuka: Her finn du oss
Myths in the Russian Collective Memory: The “Golden Era” of Pre-Revolutionary Russia and the “Disaster of 1917”
This paper examines shared ideas, values and interpretations of the past in the “collective memory” of the 1917 October Revolution. Employing a qualitative approach to examine collective memory “from below,” two age cohorts were interviewed in three Russian cities from a variety of social groups in 2014–2015. What was revealed was the existence of a strong positive myth about the pre-revolutionary era of 1900–1914, as well as positive references to the current Putin era. Both eras were “positive” in that Russia was/is a “normal European power,” “on the rise economically” and “respected by the other powers.” In terms of the definitive national trauma, an overwhelming majority viewed the 1917 October Revolution as a break or rupture in Russian history that caused appalling destruction. This view of 1917 as catastrophic leads to certain key “lessons”: that revolutionary change is inherently destructive and wasteful and that external forces had (and have) a vested interest in weakening Russia from without whenever she is at her most vulnerable. Overall, at the heart of myths over 1917 we find a central occupation with the threat of disintegration and a yearning for stability and normality, highlighting how collective memory interacts with political values and social identity.