Forsker
Andrew E. Yaw Tchie
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Sammendrag
Andrew E. Yaw Tchie er seniorforsker i Forskningsgruppen for fred, konflikt og utvikling. På NUPI arbeider han med stabilisering, fredsoperasjoner, fredsbygging og sikkerhetsassistanse i Afrika sør for Sahara. Han koordinerer også Training for Peace-programmet.
Tchie er gjesteprofessor ved University of Buckingham, gjesteforsker ved Kings College London og forsker i bistilling ved Royal United Services Institute.
Ekspertise
Utdanning
2018 Doktorgrad, Department of Government, University of Essex
2013 Mastergrad, Conflict Resolution and Peace. Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester
2011 Mastegrad, Politic and Communication, University of London, London
2006 Bachelorgrad, University of Sussex, United Kingdom (Broadcasting Research)
Arbeidserfaring
2020- Seniorforsker og koordinator for Training for Peace-programmet, NUPI
2020- Forsker i bistilling, Afrika, The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
2020- Gjesteprofessor Dept. of Humanities Research Institute, University of Buckingham
2020- Seniorforsker for Africa Security og Obasanjo Fellow, The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
2018-2020 Redaktør for Armed Conflict Database og forsker, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
2018-2020 Gjesteseniorforsker, Centre for Conflict and Health, Kings College London
2017-2018 Konfliktrådgiver, Research and Policy team, Syria Relief
2015-2017 Civil Affairs Officer, United Nation Mission in South Sudan
2015- Forsker i bistilling, University of Essex
2013-2015 Konfliktrådgiver og forsker, United Nations Development Program (Nepal)
2012- Feltforsker, Institute for Democracy and Conflict Resolution, University of Essex (Nepal)
2009-2010 Forsker, Commonwealth Secretariat
Aktivitet
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Tøm alle filtreUNITAMS Mandate Renewal Study: Fostering a Process of Trust and Inclusivity
The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) was established on 3 June 2020 under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2524 to support Sudan during its transition to democratic rule and it was renewed the following year through SC 2579(2021). UNITAMS was conceived of and designed to respond to new and long-standing issues in Sudan: the political transition process that began with the December 2018 revolution and the legacy of armed conflicts. The Mission’s mandate explicitly recognises the adverse effects of climate change on the stability of Sudan and stresses the need for appropriate risk assessment and risk management strategies. Yet, since the adoption of the Mission’s mandate in June 2020 and its renewal in June 2021, Sudan’s political, security and economic situation has deteriorated significantly. An attempted military coup in September 2021, followed by a successful coup d’état on 25 October 2021, has further worsened Sudan’s political crisis, increasing insecurity, undermining the economy, and resulting in the interruption of bilateral and international funding—all amidst the continuing global pandemic. This fast-changing political, security and economic context has placed UNITAMS in a very delicate position in relation to the host government. It has required UNITAMS to focus a significant portion of its attention on good offices and diplomacy so that, together with the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and other international partners and Sudanese stakeholders, it can support a process aimed at bringing Sudan’s transition back on track. While the UNITAMS mandate remains relevant and adequate, the Mission must continue to be allowed the flexibility to adapt its focus to the fast-changing dynamics on the ground. UNITAMS’ good offices’ role should remain at the centre of the Mission’s efforts during the next mandated period, helping Sudanese to find an inclusive political settlement that can secure a transition to democratic rule in the medium to long term. At the same time, the Mission should continue its work in support of its other objectives and priorities, including the protection of civilians, the implementation of the peace agreement, and advisory and capacity building, particularly related to the rule-of-law sector. The Mission should strengthen its focus on and ability to integrate climate-related security risks into its analytical work, especially as it relates to supporting local conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation efforts to prevent inter-communal violence. While there has been significant progress in strengthening collaboration among the UN, AU and IGAD, maintaining and sustaining the partnership must remain a key priority in the Mission’s work to promote regional stability.
ECOWAS leaders hold an emergency summit in Ghana after a series of coups on the continent
At an emergency summit in Ghana, West African regional group ECOWAS held off on ramping up penalties on Burkina Faso over its military coup. Last month, it followed Mali and Guinea, to become the third member of the block to undergo a putsch in less than two years. All three have been suspended from ECOWAS, but Burkina Faso, so far, has not faced the crippling trade and economic sanctions. The Burkina Faso Junta have shown willingness to return to constitutional order. However, there remains a wider concern over the number of coups seen in the region in the last couple of years remains. Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie discusses ECOWAS´ condemnations and sanctions over the coups and whether this concern is merited.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS)
Ahead of the March 2022 renewal of the mandate for the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) conducted an assessment focused on two core mandate areas: protection of civilians (PoC) and support for the peace process. Based on the assessment to follow, the report lays out several strategic considerations for the new UNMISS mandate: Contingency planning and preparedness: The Mission has made significant progress in building contingency plans and preparedness for a future rise in violence. Given the uncertainty around the peace process, continuing to augment the Mission’s early warn- ing and action capacities will be important. The benefits and limitations of mobility: The Mission has developed a robust capacity to deploy quick reaction forces and temporary operating bases (TOBs) across much of South Sudan, which has enabled it to play an important role in mitigating violence in some situations. Useful, small, nimble constellations of forces are very unlikely to ade- quately address the kinds of violence sporadically committed by local militia groups or large-scale mobilisation of forces, as witnessed in 2013 and 2016. Nevertheless, main- taining the current troop levels may be important in allowing the Mission to position itself for a potential rise in tensions over 2022-23. A risk-based approach to the city and surrounding areas of Malakal: The redesig- nation process has gone well so far, with no major incidents of violence related to the handover of the sites. The eventual redesignation of the PoC site at Malakal may prove the most difficult, given the elevated tension in the broader Malakal area. The Mission’s current decision not to proceed with redesignation is helpful in this regard, and future discussions should be guided by a broad-based understanding of the risks in Upper Nile State. Subnational conflict resolution: Some of UNMISS’ most effective engagements have been in addressing subnational conflict. The 2016 relapse into civil war demonstrated that localised forms of violence can spread quickly, contributing to much larger-scale fighting. Identifying ways to rapidly bolster the civilian presence in hotspot areas – potentially developing and resourcing temporary presences that allow for greater civilian accommodation – could have a beneficial impact. A resource and personnel increase around elections: UNMISS is already positioned to support the national elections and could use the process to amplify its broader role in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). This will likely require an increase in resources and personnel in the 2022-23 period. In the lead up to the new mandate in 2022, the Security Council should be guided by the continuing assessment of the Mission leadership on the levels and kind of support that might be needed, including at national and subnational levels. A constitutional opening: The R-ARCSS envisages a new constitution in place prior to elections. A new constitution could be a major step forward, opening the door to much-needed power-sharing arrangements, a framework to address national-level rec- onciliation, and a centre-periphery relationship that allows for a much more equitable distribution of wealth. This could be a real opportunity for the UN to play a construc- tive role (especially given the deep knowledge of constitutional processes of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Nicholas Haysom). Responsibility for inclusiveness: The success or failure of the constitutional and elec- toral processes will hinge largely on the extent to which the South Sudanese population views them as legitimate. Here, UNMISS’ work at the subnational level can play a vital role in increasing support for the peace process, including for governors’ forums and other local processes to facilitate ground-up engagement with the R-ARCSS. It would be useful for the Council to highlight this work and accompany it with a clear message to the R-ARCSS parties that they bear responsibility for implementing an inclusive approach to the constitution and elections. A return to state-building? While no one is seriously considering a complete return to a state-building mandate as in 2011, there may be a push by some Member States to include more capacity-building and support to state institutions in the upcoming man- date. The EPON report recommends caution in such deliberations: despite progress on the peace agreement, the South Sudanese Government is viewed with strong suspicion by many communities, especially those that were targeted during the war. Any capac- ity-building mandate should be careful to avoid being seen as “putting a finger on the scales” of a delicate inter-ethnic balance. Order from regional chaos: It is very unlikely that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) will play a robust or well-organised role in driving the peace process. Indeed, if current trends continue, the organisation may have even less capacity or focus on the R-ARCSS, further orphaning South Sudan at a time when political and operational progress is sorely needed. The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council may need to revisit the roles and responsibilities allocated to the key players in this context, possibly identifying new areas for more direct support by the AU and UN. The constitutional and electoral processes offer an opening for such a discussion, and for a re-evaluation of how the broader international commu- nity may need to step into the gaps that exist among the regional players. Climate security: South Sudan is deeply affected by climate change, from the desertifi- cation that has driven herding communities further south over recent decades to increas- ingly erratic rainfall patterns that have led to the flooding of major rivers across the country. The 2021 UNMISS mandate recognises the role of climate change in driving risks. Far more resources and attention will be needed, if the UN is to play a meaningful role in meeting the climate security challenges. Humanitarian risks: The risks to humanitarian actors in South Sudan are worth men- tioning as an area of concern for the Security Council. There are reports of increased intimidation and even violence against humanitarian actors, risks which could increase in the lead up to elections. Given UNMISS’ mandate to facilitate humanitarian delivery, calls for the Mission to protect humanitarian actors may well grow. Women and youth: Continuing threats to women and children will require UNMISS to maintain and expand its protection work in these areas. Preliminary research also indi- cates a persistent threat of sexual violence against women, girls and boys, while young men are frequent targets of recruitment into violent groups. Greater consideration could be given to these dynamics in the upcoming Council deliberations, especially given UNMISS’ role in promoting more inclusive approaches to the peace process. Space for innovation and flexibility: One of the key lessons from the 2018 EPON report and today is that UNMISS is capable of significant innovation and flexibility within the mandates given to it thus far. A recurrent message from Mission leadership and experts consulted was not to impede UNMISS with overly prescriptive mandate language. Particularly at a potentially volatile period with uncertainty over the election process, allowing the Mission space to move resources where they are most needed will be very important.
After the Coup: Regional Strategies for Sudan
The civilian leadership that is currently coordinating the civil protest can start talks with the military to hand over power in exchange for immunity. The international community; and particularly the US and its allies in Europe could help those talks through imposing timely targeted sanctions on Al-Burhan and his allies until an agreement is reached and implemented. After a settlement is reached, the civilian leadership needs to coordinate with the FFC, the armed movements, the hold out armed groups that have held out and the new military commanders through an appointed legislative council. The council should be tasked and mandated to set out a comprehensive vision for the transitional period through appointing the remaining institutions of the government and developing a clear and doable road map to the post-transition elections. And, through the legislative council, all three actors need to agree on implementing a series of programmes and deadlines to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate combatants of the armed groups and RSF into the SAF; and depoliticise the SAF which will require technical expertise and support from regional bodies such as the African Union and IGAD. Thus, it is crucial for the AU and IGAD —with support only from the Trokia states only—to consider a coherent stabilisation strategy for Sudan as a part of a broader regional stabilisation strategy anchored on AU principles that take into consideration the fluidity of the context on the ground and puts in place sustained security guarantees, economic, political and technical support with a variety of measures that help to stabilise the country and its future.
Who could replace Sudan’s PM Abdalla Hamdok?
Andrew E Yaw Tchie from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs discusses the resignation of Sudan's Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and how the country can move forward.
ECOWAS leaders hold an emergency summit in Ghana after a series of coups on the continent
At an emergency summit in Ghana, West African regional group ECOWAS held off on ramping up penalties on Burkina Faso over its military coup. Last month, it followed Mali and Guinea, to become the third member of the block to undergo a putsch in less than two years. All three have been suspended from ECOWAS, but Burkina Faso, so far, has not faced the crippling trade and economic sanctions. The Burkina Faso Junta have shown willingness to return to constitutional order. However, there remains a wider concern over the number of coups seen in the region in the last couple of years remains. Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie discusses ECOWAS´ condemnations and sanctions over the coups and whether this concern is merited.
Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: South Sudan
Uforutsigbare årlige variasjoner i ekstreme værhendelser, som flom og tørke, påvirker landbruksavhengige lokalsamfunn og pastoralistiske mobilitetsmønstre. Slike endringer kan forsterke risikoen for spenninger mellom gjetere og bønder, ofte i forbindelse med jord, beite og vann. Transhumance, inkludert migrasjon over landegrenser fra Sudan gjennom Øvre Nilen Greater Upper Nile, forverrer spredningen av veterinærsykdommer og bidrar til ødeleggelse av miljøet og konkurranse om knappe ressurser. Kvinner og jenter fortsetter å bære byrden av de negative konsekvensene av klimaendringer; Kvinneledede husstander er spesielt utsatt. Klimarelaterte husdyrtap forsterket av allerede eksisterende rivalisering øker risikoen for storfeangrep, noe som kan utløse gjengjeldelse, konflikt i lokalsamfunnet, fordrivelse, forsterket rivalisering mellom lokalsamfunn og dannelse av væpnede grupper.
Climate, Peace and Security: Sudan
Sudan er sterkt utsatt for klimaendringer. Som et av verdens minst utviklede land, samvirker ekstremvær, tilbakevendende flom og tørker og skiftende nedbør med andre sårbarheter – som nedbrytelse av økosystemer, uholdbar landbrukspraksis, naturressursknapphet og ressursbaserte konflikter – og begrenser samfunnets kapasitet til å takle og tilpasse seg klimaendringer. De økonomiske konsekvensene av COVID-19, pågående politisk ustabilitet (ytterligere forverret av militærkuppet i oktober 2021), og økende inflasjon svekker statens og samfunnets motstandskraft, levebrød og matsikkerhet. • Økende temperaturer, nedbørsvariasjoner og tørker og flom påvirker landbruket, levebrød og matsikkerhet negativt. Spesielt de negative effektene av klimaendringer, kombinert med kjønnsbaserte forskjeller i naturressursstyring, fremhever de klimarelaterte sikkerhetsrisikoene for kvinner og jenter. • Høye nivåer av fordrivelse skjerper humanitære behov og sårbarhet for virkningene av klimaendringer; skiftende migrasjonsmønstre som svar på endret ressurstilgjengelighet kan øke risikoen for lokale konflikter i enkelte områder
Grappling with and Adapting to Climate Change in South Sudan
Almost a decade since the conflict in South Sudan commenced, the conflict has become further fragmented, with indiscriminate violence across the country being highly varied. Playing into these complex conflict dynamics are the impacts of climate change,which may further grievances and tensions. South Sudan is one of the countries in the world most affected by climate change. It is projected that by the mid-21st century, the Sahel band will include South Sudan. Adding to this challenge is a lack of sufficient funding, knowledge capacity and technical resources, weakening the government’s ability to adapt to the impacts of climate change, further increasing climate-related security risks
Faktaark: Klima, fred og sikkerhet i Sudan