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Niels Nagelhus Schia
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Sammendrag
Niels Nagelhus Schia (PhD fra Universitetet i Oslo) er forsker 1 ved NUPI, hvor han over flere år har fordypet seg i spørsmål som omhandler global styring, internasjonale organisasjoner, og statsbygging.
Schia er leder for Forskningsgruppen for sikkerhet og forsvar. Han er også medleder i NUPIs forskningssenter for digitalisering og cybersikkerhet og jobber med forskningsprosjekter som omhandler politiske og samfunnsmessige aspekter ved cybersikkerhet. Mer konkret handler disse prosjektene om globale utfordringer når det gjelder styring av cyberspace, kapasitetsbygging i utviklingsland, samt internasjonalt samarbeid mellom stater og private aktører knyttet til det digitale rom. I forskningsprosjekt GAIA ser han på koblinger mellom digitale verdikjeder, nasjonal autonomi og internasjonal politikk. Prosjektet er finansiert av Forskningsrådets IKTPLUSS-program og er et samarbeidsprosjekt mellom SIMULA og NUPI, samt en rekke andre internasjonale universiteter og institutter.
Schia har lang erfaring i å planlegge og utføre forskningsoppdrag. Disse oppdragene har gjerne handlet om internasjonale organisasjoners rolle i fredsbyggingsprosesser, global governance, samarbeidsprosesser i internasjonalpolitikk, diplomacy og transnasjonale prosesser relatert til post-konflikt situasjoner. Schia er utdannet sosialantropolog med en doktorgrad fra Universitetet i Oslo og har bred feltarbeidserfaring fra internasjonale organisasjoner og Afrika. Et hovedfokus i hans forskning er fokuset på globale koblinger til mer lokale, nasjonale og regionale spørsmål og prosesser. Dette er også tema i boken Franchised States and the Bureaucracy of Peace (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), samt i kapittelet Horseshoe and Catwalk: Power, Complexity and Consensus-Making in the United Nations Security Council i boken Palaces of Hope: The Anthropology of Global Organizations (Cambridge University Press, 2017) og i artikkelen The Cyber Frontier and Digital Pitfalls in the Global South (Third World Quarterly, 2018).
I tilknytning til sin forskning har Schia organisert en rekke seminarer og konferanser internasjonalt og nasjonalt. I dette arbeidet har han hatt utstrakt kontakt med akademiske miljøer samt fagmiljøer og er vant til å jobbe i skjæringspunktet mellom akademisk og anvendt forskning.
Schia har publisert sin forskning i internasjonale og nasjonale tidsskrifter som Third World Quarterly, European Journal of International Relations, International Peacekeeping, Journal of International Relations and Development og Political and Legal Anthropology. Han har mottatt ulike forskningsstipend blant annet fra Fulbright og Norges forskningsråd.
Fra og med januar 2017 er han medredaktør for Internasjonal Politikk, det ledende skandinaviskspråklige fagtidsskriftet innenfor internasjonale studier, sammen med Pernille Rieker og Minda Holm.
Ekspertise
Utdanning
2015 Doktorgrad, sosialantropologi, Universitetet i Oslo
2004 Cand.polit., Universitetet i Oslo, Sosialantropologi
Arbeidserfaring
2022- Leder, Forskningsgruppen for sikkerhet og forsvar
2017- Redaktør for Internasjonal Politikk - Skandinavisk Tidsskrift for Internasjonale Studier.
2015- Leder, NUPIs Forskningssenter på cybersikkehet.
2010 Gjesteforsker ved The New School for Social Research, New York, Leiv Eirikson mobilitetsprogram (Norges forskningsråd), og Fulbright scholar.
2009 Rådgiver, Civil Affairs, Policy Best Practices Services (PBPS), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York.
2003- Forsker 1 / Seniorforsker / Forsker / Vit. ass., NUPI.
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2012-2016 Styremedlem Fulbright Alumni Association of Norway.
2013-2016 Leder, vitenskapelig komité for Fulbrights årlige forskningspris.
Aktivitet
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Tøm alle filtreFinding a European response to Huawei’s 5G ambitions
This policy brief suggests that European countries should institute national reviewing boards overseen by intelligence agencies to vet Huawei equipment. If that is not feasible due to a lack of resources or capabilities especially among smaller countries, European governments should consider pooling resources and create a common reviewing board. This would also prevent duplication of efforts on national levels. European authorities should also demand from Huawei to clearly separate its international from its domestic business operations in order to further reduce the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of European mobile networks.
Parabasis: Cyber-diplomacy in Stalemate
Governments and industry around the world are working together to bring the next billion users online,1 but their synergies fade when it comes to how to keep online populations safe and secure. Further, the third and fourth billion of Internet users will enter a terrain very different from that available to their predecessors. Vulnerabilities in ICTs as well as de facto exploitation of these vulnerabilities by state and non-state actors has been acknowledged and problematized. Evidence of malicious and hostile operations involving ICTs and the Internet abounds. Uncertain about the true potential of ICTs, governments and users have focused on rules and responsibilities for protecting against cyberattacks, espionage and data manipulation. But where is there an understanding of how to remedy and improve the situation? The first part of this report analyzes and contextualizes the UN First Committee process. The second part offers the authors’ extensions to the theme, analyzing the relative successes and failures of the leading cyberpowers in promoting the world order of their liking. In particular, we analyze how Russia, as the initiator of the First Committee process, has created momentum and gathered support for its calls for specific international regulation and institutionalization of the process on the one hand, and stronger governmental control of the development and use of ICTs and the flow of information on the other. In conclusion, we offer some recommendations for governments wishing to pursue the goal of free and open cyberspace—indeed a rule-based world order. The full text can be read here: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2569401
International Cybersecurity: Orchestral Manoeuvres in the Dark
Tikk and Kerttunen inform new entrants and nonparticipating governments of the discussions and outcomes of the UN First Committee Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and discuss prospects for the 2019/2020 GGE. They explain why the Group will not able to provide answers to practical cybersecurity issues facing the majority of states. The authors call states to critically review their reasons for and expectations towards the UN First Committee dialogue on international cybersecurity.
The Chinese Cyber Sovereignty Concept (Part 1 & 2)
Cyber sovereignty is a distinct concept from the more familiar term cybersecurity, which concerns protecting the infrastructure and processes connected to the Internet. Cyber sovereignty, on the other hand, is concerned with the information and content the Internet provides. China’s cyber sovereignty concept is based on two key principles: The first is that unwanted influence in a country’s “information space” should be banned. In effect, this would allow countries to prevent their citizens from being exposed to ideas and opinions deemed harmful by the regime. The other key principle is to move the governance of the Internet from the current bodies, which includes in them academics and companies, to an international forum such as the UN. This move would also entail a transfer of power from companies and individuals to states alone.
Managing a Digital Revolution - Cyber Security Capacity Building in Myanmar
Digitalization is exposing developing countries to a growing number of risks, as well as opportunities associated with connecting to the Internet. Myanmar stands out as a critical case of both the pitfalls and the benefits Internet connection can bring. Amidst a political transition from military rule to a functioning democracy Myanmar is adding ICT to key areas like banking and e-government. Having been one of the least connected countries in the world only five years ago the country is now connecting to the Internet at an unprecedented pace, with little or no institutions in place to ensure the transition goes smoothly. Using the framework of Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB) we examine the risks and potential benefits of Myanmar’s embracement of digital technologies.
3 grunner til at Norge bør med i FNs sikkerhetsråd
Norge kan gjøre Sikkerhetsrådet enda bedre og enda mer relevant, skriver Niels Nagelhus Schia.
Tre grunner til at Norge bør med i FNs sikkerhetsråd
Norge har meldt seg på i kampen om en plass i FNs Sikkerhetsråd i 2021-2022. Kronikken presenterer 3 grunner til at Norge bør med i Sikkerhetsrådet.
Cyber Security Capacity Building in Myanmar
Digitalization is exposing developing countries to a growing number of risks, as well as opportunities associated with connecting to the Internet. Myanmar stands out as a critical case of both the pitfalls and the benefits Internet connection can bring. Amidst a political transition from military rule to a functioning democracy Myanmar is adding ICT to key areas like banking and e-government. Having been one of the least connected countries in the world only five years ago the country is now connecting to the Internet at an unprecedented pace, with little or no institutions in place to ensure the transition goes smoothly. Using the framework of Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB) we examine the risks and potential benefits of Myanmar’s embracement of digital technologies.
Internasjonal politikk og cyberspace
Karsten Geier, internasjonal ekspert på cyber og tryggleik, besøkjer NUPI for å gi deg ei oversikt over det som er verd å vite om internasjonalt cyberdiplomati.
Everyday sovereignty: International experts, brokers and local ownership in peacebuilding Liberia
The present article investigates how sovereignty is performed, enacted and constructed in an everyday setting. Based on fieldwork and interviews with international embedded experts about the elusive meaning of ‘local ownership’, we argue that while sovereignty may, indeed, be a model according to which the international community ‘constructs’ rogue or failed polities in ‘faraway’ places, this view overlooks that these places are still spaces in which contestations over spheres of authority take place every day, and thus also spaces in which sovereignty is constructed and reconstructed on a daily basis. Local ownership, then, becomes our starting point for tracing the processes of the everyday enactment of sovereignty. We make the case that sovereignty should not be reified, but instead be studied in its quotidian and dynamic production, involving the multiplicity of actors reflecting the active production of the state beyond its presumptive existence as a homogeneously organized, institutionalized and largely centralized bureaucracy.