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Niels Nagelhus Schia
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Sammendrag
Niels Nagelhus Schia (PhD fra Universitetet i Oslo) er forsker 1 ved NUPI, hvor han over flere år har fordypet seg i spørsmål som omhandler global styring, internasjonale organisasjoner, og statsbygging.
Niels Nagelhus Schia er forskningsprofessor med spesialisering i skjæringspunktet mellom ny teknologi og internasjonale relasjoner. Han leder Forskningsgruppen for sikkerhet og forsvar ved NUPI, og han er også medleder i instituttets senter for forskning på ny teknologi. Med en doktorgrad i sosialantropologi fra Universitetet i Oslo og et gjesteforskeropphold fra New School for Social Research (NSSR), kombinerer Schia akademisk innsikt med praktisk erfaring innen global og nasjonal politikkutforming.
Schia har ledet initiativer som den norske regjeringens ekspertgruppe for kunstig intelligens, demokrati og valg (2024–2025). Han var koordinator for referansegruppen om Norges rolle i FNs sikkerhetsråd (2021–2022), og han har vært prosjektleder for flere større forskningsprosjekter. Han er også en aktiv bidragsyter til internasjonale konferanser, diskusjoner i FN og ulike arbeidsgrupper.
Utover forskningen er Schia dypt engasjert i å forme den globale akademiske og politiske arenaen. Han var medredaktør for Internasjonal Politikk, det ledende skandinaviske tidsskriftet om internasjonale relasjoner, i nesten et tiår (2017–2025). Han er medlem av Holberg-debattens arbeidsgruppe, og fagrådet til FN-sambandet. Schia er ogsåtidligere Fulbright-stipendiat og styremedlem i Fulbright Association i Norge og andre fora dedikert til å fremme kunnskap og dialog innen sitt felt.
Ekspertise
Utdanning
2015 Doktorgrad, sosialantropologi, Universitetet i Oslo
2004 Cand.polit., Universitetet i Oslo, Sosialantropologi
Arbeidserfaring
2022- Leder, Forskningsgruppen for sikkerhet og forsvar
2017- Redaktør for Internasjonal Politikk - Skandinavisk Tidsskrift for Internasjonale Studier.
2015- Leder, NUPIs Forskningssenter på cybersikkehet.
2010 Gjesteforsker ved The New School for Social Research, New York, Leiv Eirikson mobilitetsprogram (Norges forskningsråd), og Fulbright scholar.
2009 Rådgiver, Civil Affairs, Policy Best Practices Services (PBPS), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York.
2003- Forsker 1 / Seniorforsker / Forsker / Vit. ass., NUPI.
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2012-2016 Styremedlem Fulbright Alumni Association of Norway.
2013-2016 Leder, vitenskapelig komité for Fulbrights årlige forskningspris.
Aktivitet
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Tøm alle filtreThe Politics of Stability: Cement and Change in Cyber Affairs
In November 2018, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, inaugurated one year earlier ‘to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace’, launched six norms pointing ‘the way to new opportunities for increasing the stability of cyberspace’. However, the Commission has not examined or explained the very concept it was established to explore. Quite the contrary, the Commission argues that its proposed norms will be used to define what cyber stability actually is. Focusing on the interrelationship between international peace and stability, and ways of achieving both in the context of ICTs, the authors will offer a model of stability of cyberspace. They begin by examining the concepts of ‘stability’ and ‘strategic stability’ as understood with regard to international security. This conceptual analysis is followed by a presentation of the political claims of stability expressed in national and international cyber-and information-security discourses. Drawing on the conceptual approaches and the political claims, the report then model the stability of cyberspace in three interlinked and reinforcing dimensions: 1) equal and inclusive international relations; 2) prevention of war: the minimal peace, with emphasis on averting a devastating nuclear war between the superpowers; and 3) the functionality of global and national technical systems and services. After discussing how international law, preventive diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and norms of responsible state behaviour can support cyberspace stability, this report concludes with recommendations for action aimed at helping to create and maintain a stable - resilient and adaptive - cyberspace.
Forebygging av krig og konflikt i cyberdomenet
Cyberdomenet representerer kanskje en av vår tids største trusler mot internasjonal fred og sikkerhet men er viet lite oppmerksomhet hva gjelder forebygging av krig og konflikt. Det er behov for internasjonale forpliktende kjøreregler som hever blikket over IKT-forvaltning, digitalisering og cybersikkerhetstiltak og fokuserer på fredelige relasjoner mellom stater i cyberdomenet. Skal en slik diskusjon ha effekt må den tas i FNs Sikkerhetsråd.
Digital sovereignty and autonomy (GAIA)
NUPI in collaboration with Simula Research Lab will map global data flows and their impact on national autonomy and sovereignty. ...
Finding a European response to Huawei’s 5G ambitions
This policy brief suggests that European countries should institute national reviewing boards overseen by intelligence agencies to vet Huawei equipment. If that is not feasible due to a lack of resources or capabilities especially among smaller countries, European governments should consider pooling resources and create a common reviewing board. This would also prevent duplication of efforts on national levels. European authorities should also demand from Huawei to clearly separate its international from its domestic business operations in order to further reduce the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of European mobile networks.
Digitale trusler og demokrati (PRODEM)
Hvordan håndterer stater den økte risikoen for at digitale medier brukes til påvirkning og undergraving av demokratiske prosesser? ...
Parabasis: Cyber-diplomacy in Stalemate
Governments and industry around the world are working together to bring the next billion users online,1 but their synergies fade when it comes to how to keep online populations safe and secure. Further, the third and fourth billion of Internet users will enter a terrain very different from that available to their predecessors. Vulnerabilities in ICTs as well as de facto exploitation of these vulnerabilities by state and non-state actors has been acknowledged and problematized. Evidence of malicious and hostile operations involving ICTs and the Internet abounds. Uncertain about the true potential of ICTs, governments and users have focused on rules and responsibilities for protecting against cyberattacks, espionage and data manipulation. But where is there an understanding of how to remedy and improve the situation? The first part of this report analyzes and contextualizes the UN First Committee process. The second part offers the authors’ extensions to the theme, analyzing the relative successes and failures of the leading cyberpowers in promoting the world order of their liking. In particular, we analyze how Russia, as the initiator of the First Committee process, has created momentum and gathered support for its calls for specific international regulation and institutionalization of the process on the one hand, and stronger governmental control of the development and use of ICTs and the flow of information on the other. In conclusion, we offer some recommendations for governments wishing to pursue the goal of free and open cyberspace—indeed a rule-based world order. The full text can be read here: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2569401
International Cybersecurity: Orchestral Manoeuvres in the Dark
Tikk and Kerttunen inform new entrants and nonparticipating governments of the discussions and outcomes of the UN First Committee Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and discuss prospects for the 2019/2020 GGE. They explain why the Group will not able to provide answers to practical cybersecurity issues facing the majority of states. The authors call states to critically review their reasons for and expectations towards the UN First Committee dialogue on international cybersecurity.
The Chinese Cyber Sovereignty Concept (Part 1 & 2)
Cyber sovereignty is a distinct concept from the more familiar term cybersecurity, which concerns protecting the infrastructure and processes connected to the Internet. Cyber sovereignty, on the other hand, is concerned with the information and content the Internet provides. China’s cyber sovereignty concept is based on two key principles: The first is that unwanted influence in a country’s “information space” should be banned. In effect, this would allow countries to prevent their citizens from being exposed to ideas and opinions deemed harmful by the regime. The other key principle is to move the governance of the Internet from the current bodies, which includes in them academics and companies, to an international forum such as the UN. This move would also entail a transfer of power from companies and individuals to states alone.
Managing a Digital Revolution - Cyber Security Capacity Building in Myanmar
Digitalization is exposing developing countries to a growing number of risks, as well as opportunities associated with connecting to the Internet. Myanmar stands out as a critical case of both the pitfalls and the benefits Internet connection can bring. Amidst a political transition from military rule to a functioning democracy Myanmar is adding ICT to key areas like banking and e-government. Having been one of the least connected countries in the world only five years ago the country is now connecting to the Internet at an unprecedented pace, with little or no institutions in place to ensure the transition goes smoothly. Using the framework of Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB) we examine the risks and potential benefits of Myanmar’s embracement of digital technologies.