Working Paper on enabling environments, drivers, and occurrence/nonoccurrence of violent extremism
Why does violent extremism not occur in enabling environments? Based on recent field work in the Sahel and the Maghreb region this is the main question we seek to understand in this working paper. To understand non-occurrence and thereby the foundations of social and individual resilience, we also need to understand the drivers of violent extremism and why they gain traction among some populations while others show much higher degrees of resilience. To achieve this, we will zoom in on cases in Mali, Niger, Tunisia and Morocco, showcasing different trajectories of occurrence and non-occurrence.
Policy brief summarizing lessons learnt on the EU’s measures to prevent violent extremism in the region
How do EU initiatives that are geared to help prevent and counter violent extremism in North Africa and the Sahel match the underlying drivers of radicalisation? This PREVEX Policy Brief offers a reading of EU strategies in the backlight of our findings, which stem from fieldwork that was conducted in cases of both occurrence and non-occurrence of violent extremist escalation across North Africa and the Sahel. As scholarly literature lays emphasis on how phenomena such as violent extremism are highly context-dependent, it is crucial to understand regional and local dynamics of social change and intermediation. This brief therefore provides an overall assessment of EU P/CVE policies and projects in North Africa and the Sahel, focusing on key contextual policy issues: democratic governance, rule of law, education, gender, reintegration. It argues that EU’s emphasis on rule of law is particularly appropriate, while there is room for greater engagement in the fields of education and reintegration – provided that conflict-sensitive lenses are carefully applied. In the fields of democratic governance and gender, instead, a mismatch between general strategies and on-the-ground implementation can be observed. Targeted research in these critical areas of intervention and assistance is highly needed. Overall, our analysis invites to consider radicalisation processes not as social pathology but as ongoing social phenomena that take place in a space where several actors rival for material and ideational resources, and therefore require careful assessment and multi-scalar prioritisation, including at the regional and transnational level.
Working Paper on ´enabling environments´, drivers and occurrence/nonoccurrence of violent extremism in the region
There are a number of grievances attributed as drivers of violent extremism. Poverty, autocratic governance, human rights violations, precarious masculinities, or the lack of education, mentioning just some, all create what we may term “enabling environments”. Still, the majority living in such enabling environments and who experience such grievances do not engage in any acts of violence or join any violent extremist organizations. This begs the question, why do some communities display far greater resilience to violent extremist ideologies than others? Based on in-depth fieldwork in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, we study and analyze four cases of the non-occurrence of violent extremism in the Middle East to further our understanding of enabling environments, community resilience, and the decisive moments pushing people to, or away from, violence.
Policy brief summarizing lessons learnt on the EU’s measures to prevent violent extremism in the region
There are a number of grievances attributed as drivers of violent extremism. Poverty, autocratic governance and human rights violations, precarious masculinities, or the lack of education, mentioning just some, all create what we may term “enabling environments” – areas in which various factors create a conducive situation where segments of its population become prone to violent extremism. Still, the majority living in such enabling environments and experiencing these grievances do not engage in any acts of violence or join any extremist organizations. This begs the question, why do some communities display far greater resilience to violent extremist ideologies than others? In our newly released PREVEX working paper analyzing the drivers, occurrence, and non-occurrence of violent extremism in the MENA region, we study four cases of the nonoccurrence of violent extremism in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq.1 Specifically, we analyze why segments among disenfranchised Islamist Egyptian youth, the majority of Jordanian jihadists, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and the Syrian village Swedan in the Deir Ez-Zor province have displayed a far greater resilience to carrying out violent extremism than others. We assess the role and importance of local community and religious leaders, the role of tribal affiliation, ideological exposure, good governance and political inclusion, poverty and marginalization, and state repression. We address both a scholarly puzzle and a policy problem. If the aforementioned grievances create enabling environments conducive to violent extremism, why is it that the majority in these situations actually abstain from violence and reject extremist ideologies? What does that tell us about the role and dynamics of enabling environments? The policy problem relates to how one evaluates, weighs, and approaches populations in enabling environments and who are thus perceived to be prone to violent extremism. Put bluntly, should a population residing in an enabling environment be treated as future extremists or terrorists, to wit, a problem in need of securitization? Necessarily, these findings have consequences for how we perceive the feasibility of past and current EU funding programs intended to prevent violent extremism in the Middle East.
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Narges Mohammadi mottar Nobels fredspris 2023
Messaging Soleimani's killing: the communication vulnerabilities of authoritarian states
Kapasiteten til autoritære stater til å manipulere narrativer og undergrave autoriteten til vestlige demokratier blir stadig mer vektlagt i forskning innen internasjonale relasjoner. Langt mindre oppmerksomhet har blitt viet til måtene medieomgivelsene skaper kommunikasjonsårbarheter for disse samme undertrykkende statene. Vi adresserer dette gapet i forskningen gjennom en case-studie av persiskspråklig mediedekning av drapet på General Qasem Soleimani - et klimaks i konflikten mellom Iran og USA. Vi undersøker hvordan kommentatorer på de to populære satellittkanalene BBC Persian og Iran International tolket angrepet på Soleimani og de dramatiske hendelsene som fulgte, og spør om de samlet seg rundt det iranske flagget. Forskningsmetoden som ble brukt, er kvalitativ medieinnholdsanalyse. Undersøkelsen avslører at Den islamske republikken ikke nøt godt av en økning i patriotisme blant iranske kommentatorer; faktisk applauderte noen åpent angrepet. Det var først da President Trump truet med å bombe iranske kulturskatter at kommentatorene samlet seg rundt flagget. Den islamske republikken sto overfor en to-fronts narrativkamp ettersom kommunikasjonsangrep fra iranere i eksil intensiverte informasjonskrigen med USA. Artikkelen konkluderer med at autoritære stater er sårbare når de trenger kommunikasjonsstrategier utover desinformasjon og forvrengning.
Kampen om fortellingen om drapet på generalen
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Få med deg denne samtalen om den russiske Wagner-gruppens aktiviteter i Afrika.