Arktis

Norge er en stormakt innen havforskning - FNs tiår for havforskning må gi et ytterligere løft

Tilstanden i verdenshavene er på dagsordenen. Klimaendringer, forurensing, overbeskatning av ressurser og andre problemer krever mer og bedre forskning for å forstå disse og skaffe kunnskapsgrunnlaget for en bedre og mer effektiv forvaltning. FNs generalforsamling har erklært perioden 2021-2030 som FNs tiår for havforskning. Dette gir oss en mulighet til å styrke både forskning og forvaltning tilknyttet våre havområder.

Frenemies: Arctic cooperation in conflict and a view from Russia

Arctic governance: fit for future challenges?

Non-Arctic countries and Arctic politics

Red Arctic? Affective Geopolitics and the 2007 Russian Flag-planting Incident in the Central Arctic Ocean

This chapter discusses visual representation and Arctic geopolitics, exploring how the image of the flag planted on the Arctic seabed by Russia has persisted as a core visual image of Arctic politics. Using Google Image Search, we compare the pervasiveness of this image with a small selectin of potential image-events of the Arctic, representing different storylines of Arctic politics, and find that they remain comparatively marginal. The chapter considers why the flag-planting image remains so central to Arctic geopolitics by briefly discussion reception and re-use of the flag-planting image in Canada, Russia and the United States.

A Governance and Risk Inventory for a Changing Arctic

Elana Wilson Rowe, Ulf Sverdrup, Karsten Friis, Geir Hønneland og Mike Sfraga advarer i dette kapitlet mot å anse konflikt- og samarbeidstrender i Arktis som binære termer. Mens USA og Europa bestemt vil konfrontere ondsinnet aktivitet i regionen, fortsetter alle parter med å ‘vise forpliktelse til samarbeid og felles løsninger på felles utfordringer’. I dette kapitlet går forfatterne gjennom faktorer og drivere som støtter og utfordrer stabiliteten i Arktis. De minner om at ‘samarbeid i konflikt’ lenge har vært normen i regionen, noe som har gjort det mulig for samarbeidsstyring å utvikle seg trass militær rivalisering mellom NATO og Russland. Å fokusere på ‘narrativer eller praksiser rundt strategisk konkurranse alene’ er lite hensiktsmessig for pågående dialog i regionen, noe som er essensielt for å ta opp regionale og globale implikasjoner av klimaendringer. Forfatterne oppfordrer policymakere til å være mer proaktive i hvordan de tar opp fremvoksende styringsutfordringer knyttet til utfordringer innen sikkerhet og økonomisk utvikling, for å unngå ‘politiske vippepunkter’ som kan gjøre samarbeid vanskeligere.

Climate Change and Security in the Arctic

A new report by the Center for Climate and Security (CCS), an Institute of the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR), together with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), assesses the security risks posed by a warming climate in the Artcic. The analysis looks at two future warming scenarios (curbed and uncurbed) to project security threats alongside potential environmental changes deemed likely in the High North by 2030. The analysis identifies a number of key climate security risks across both warming scenarios, but notes that the risks are more severe and more likely in an “uncurbed” warming scenario. In a “curbed” scenario in which the world takes rapid action to curb climate change, including by transforming energy use, decarbonizing the global economy, and building international institutions to manage climate risks, the Arctic is likely to see fewer opportunities for severe security risks. The report recommends integrating this climate risk analysis into Arctic planning strategies into the coming years, and avoiding the uncurbed warming scenario. Specifically, the analysis highlights five key findings: 1) A warmer and increasingly navigable Arctic will lead to more commercial, civilian, and military activity, rendering the region more prone to accidents and misunderstandings between major players. 2) Increased commercial activity significantly expands the likelihood of states like Russia and China using civilian and commercial actors as vehicles for strategic positioning, dual-use data collection, and for gray zone operations which may escalate to direct confrontation. 3) The institutions that have helped depoliticize and produce stability in the Arctic for several decades may not have sufficient mandates and authorities, or be resilient enough to withstand new demands resulting from climate change. 4) To manage a more complex operating environment in the Arctic, with ever more state and non-state actors, governments will need an integrated toolbox that includes legal, economic, diplomatic, and military instruments. Robust mechanisms for cooperation and communication with civilian and commercial actors will be particularly useful. 5) States are likely to place higher demands on their military forces in the Arctic, particularly as regards to monitoring, assertions of sovereignty, search and rescue, and other Coast Guard duties given higher levels of overall activity in the region. New climatic realities may also reduce the constraints for force projection in the region. At the same time, over-reliance on military approaches in the region could risk escalating conflicts. To build resilience to the above threats, the report recommends that allied Arctic nations begin to advance the elaboration of a “Military Code of Conduct for Arctic Forces,” or other form of renewed dialogue among regional security actors, to address joint security risks.