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Forskerstafett: Et samfunn under angrep — Ukraina i dag og i fremtiden

På Norsk utenrikspolitisk konferanse 2026 holdt syv forskere innlegg om de viktigste temaene for norsk utenrikspolitikk i dag. Her kan du lese Anna Chebotarovas (UiO og NUPI) bidrag.
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Foto: Therese Leine/NUPI

Personer

Anna Chebotarova
Universitet i Oslo

Ukraine is about to enter the fifth year of full-scale war — a duration that already exceeds the time of Nazi occupation of the country. Drawing on polling data and expert interviews, I will briefly discuss how prolonged war is reshaping Ukrainian society and the visions for the future.

Let us start with the question of peace. Ukrainians remain deeply sceptical of the current negotiations. They take place while the critical infrastructure is constantly attacked and destroyed. The centre of Odesa has been heavily bombed just this morning. In Kyiv alone, more than 1,000 residential blocks remain without heating in freezing temperatures as we speak. This is seen not a “pressure tactic,” but a war crime.

Hence, according to the most recent KIIS polls 69% of Ukrainians believe that current negotiations are doomed to fail. This does not mean people reject diplomacy. Rather, peace is understood as a security condition, and Russia is widely seen as the side unwilling to compromise.

In early 2022, Ukraine witnessed an extraordinary level of voluntary mobilisation. Hundreds of thousands queued at enlistment offices, driven primarily by the will to protect their homes, families and the shared value – the independence of their state.

Over time, heavy casualties, war fatigue, and the absence of a clear service horizon have taken their toll. Despite significant problems with mobilisation and general exhaustion, readiness to resist has remained durable. As many of our respondents noted, for most Ukrainians, the alternative to resistance is occupation — filtration camps, torture, and the erasure of Ukrainian identity. This understanding is shaped not only by the experience of the current war, but also by historical memories of mass violence, repression, and famine.

Russia is therefore perceived not as a limited threat, but as an existential one. Eighty-three per cent of respondents think that Russia’s current goal is not Donbas, but the complete subjugation and destruction of the Ukrainian state. This understanding is what shapes politics, societal resistance, and future visions.

At the same time, Ukrainians feel the cost of war. The fatigue is palpable, and optimism about a quick end has faded. Many now expect the war to last for years. This has pushed society from emergency mobilisation toward long-term societal adaptation. Mutual aid networks and civic responsibility have become embedded features of everyday life.

Another important issue is democracy under fire. While martial law and mobilisation impose significant constraints on freedoms and human rights, Ukrainians today remain engaged and activated. 70% see corruption as the major problem. The scandals around it damage societal trust and directly harm defence capacity. Yet even in wartime, we have witnessed recent mass protests, while investigative journalists and anti-corruption institutions play a pivotal role.

This endurance, however, unfolds against a severe demographic crisis. According to various estimates, 8 to 11 million Ukrainians are currently displaced abroad, while hundreds of thousands have been killed or injured. Hence, demography will be one of the most constraining factors in the post-war period, economically, socially, and politically. An optimistic trajectory would imply a more multicultural Ukraine, attracting migrants and talents from around the world — but this requires security and economic success.

Yet war has also produced an unusually high level of societal preparedness for crises. This experience is costly and traumatic, but it also produces knowledge. There is much that other countries can and should learn from Ukraine in a rapidly changing and increasingly unstable global order. As one of our respondents put it, Europe should be prepared for crises and conflicts of tomorrow, not yesterday.

Looking ahead, even under an positive scenario, the post-war recovery will be marked by trauma, reintegration, demographic challenges, and intense political competition. Trust in traditional parties remains low, while demand for new leaders — often from civil society or the military — is growing.

Despite everything, Ukrainians remain optimistic about the future. The share of those who believe that, in ten years, Ukraine will be a prosperous EU country (64%) is three times higher than those who expect a ruined, devastated country (21%). Paradoxically, this optimism has increased compared to last year. Yet for it to materialise, Russia must be stopped.

To sum up, Ukraine today is not collapsing. It is redefining itself under fire. What comes tomorrow will depend not only on the battlefield and diplomacy, but on whether expectations of security, dignity, and justice are met. Ukrainians see an unjust peace that rewards aggression not as an endpoint of war, but as a mere countdown to a new attack.

Les oppsummeringssaken om konferansen her, og få med deg NUPI-direktør Kari Oslands tale og alle innleggene i forskerstafetten:

Temaer

  • Forsvar
  • Utenrikspolitikk
  • Europa
  • Russland og Eurasia
  • Konflikt
  • Analyse

Personer

Anna Chebotarova
Universitet i Oslo